Procurement bidding with restrictions
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References listed on IDEAS
- Jean-Pierre Benoît & Vijay Krishna, 2001.
"Multiple-Object Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Oxford University Press, vol. 68(1), pages 155-179.
- Jean-Pierre Benoit & Vijay Krishna, 1998. "Multiple-Object Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders," Game Theory and Information 9805001, EconWPA, revised 26 Jul 1999.
- Levitan, Richard & Shubik, Martin, 1972. "Price Duopoly and Capacity Constraints," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 13(1), pages 111-122, February.
- Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale, 1998. "Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 65(1), pages 1-21.
- John Morgan & Michael R. Baye, 2002. "Winner-take-all price competition," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), pages 271-282.
- Harrington, Joseph Jr., 1989. "A re-evaluation of perfect competition as the solution to the Bertrand price game," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 315-328, June.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Martin G. Kocher & Stefan T. Trautmann, 2013.
"Selection Into Auctions For Risky And Ambiguous Prospects,"
Western Economic Association International, vol. 51(1), pages 882-895, January.
- Martin G. Kocher & Stefan T. Trautmann, 2010. "Selection into auctions for risky and ambiguous prospects," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 10-06, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
More about this item
KeywordsBidding; Pricing strategy; Procurement strategy; Bertrand paradox; Game theory; D4; D44; H57; C72;
- D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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