Procurement bidding with restrictions
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- Richard E. Levitan & Martin Shubik, 1970.
"Price Duopoly and Capacity Constraints,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
287, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Jean-Pierre Benoit & Vijay Krishna, 1998.
"Multiple-Object Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders,"
Game Theory and Information
9805001, EconWPA, revised 26 Jul 1999.
- Jean-Pierre Benoît & Vijay Krishna, 2001. "Multiple-Object Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 68(1), pages 155-179.
- Harrington, Joseph Jr., 1989. "A re-evaluation of perfect competition as the solution to the Bertrand price game," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 315-328, June.
- Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale, 1998. "Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 65(1), pages 1-21.
- John Morgan & Michael R. Baye, 2002. "Winner-take-all price competition," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 19(2), pages 271-282.
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