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Procurement bidding with restrictions

Author

Listed:
  • Ganesh Iyer

    ()

  • Amit Pazgal

    ()

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Ganesh Iyer & Amit Pazgal, 2008. "Procurement bidding with restrictions," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 177-204, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:qmktec:v:6:y:2008:i:2:p:177-204 DOI: 10.1007/s11129-007-9033-5
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11129-007-9033-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jean-Pierre BenoƮt & Vijay Krishna, 2001. "Multiple-Object Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 68(1), pages 155-179.
    2. Levitan, Richard & Shubik, Martin, 1972. "Price Duopoly and Capacity Constraints," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 13(1), pages 111-122, February.
    3. Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale, 1998. "Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 65(1), pages 1-21.
    4. John Morgan & Michael R. Baye, 2002. "Winner-take-all price competition," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), pages 271-282.
    5. Harrington, Joseph Jr., 1989. "A re-evaluation of perfect competition as the solution to the Bertrand price game," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 315-328, June.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Martin G. Kocher & Stefan T. Trautmann, 2013. "Selection Into Auctions For Risky And Ambiguous Prospects," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 51(1), pages 882-895, January.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bidding; Pricing strategy; Procurement strategy; Bertrand paradox; Game theory; D4; D44; H57; C72;

    JEL classification:

    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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