IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Selection Into Auctions For Risky And Ambiguous Prospects

  • MARTIN G. KOCHER
  • STEFAN T. TRAUTMANN

We study experimentally the selection into first-price sealed-bid auctions for a risky or an ambiguous prospect. Most subjects chose to submit a bid for the risky prospect, leading to thinner markets for the ambiguous prospect. Transaction prices for both prospects were equal although subjects expected the ambiguous markets to be smaller. Evidence of a positive correlation between risk and ambiguity aversion suggests that the ambiguous markets were populated by relatively risk tolerant bidders. A control experiment with selection in a simple choice task shows that subjects correctly anticipate the effects of selection on market size and risk attitudes.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2010.00347.x
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Article provided by Western Economic Association International in its journal Economic Inquiry.

Volume (Year): 51 (2013)
Issue (Month): 1 (01)
Pages: 882-895

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:51:y:2013:i:1:p:882-895
Contact details of provider: Postal: 18830 Brookhurst Street, Suite 304, Fountain Valley, CA 92708 USA
Phone: 714-965-8800
Fax: 714-965-8829
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0095-2583
Email:


More information through EDIRC

Order Information: Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=0095-2583

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Janssen, Maarten C.W., 2006. "Auctions as coordination devices," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 517-532, April.
  2. Camerer, Colin & Weber, Martin, 1992. " Recent Developments in Modeling Preferences: Uncertainty and Ambiguity," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 5(4), pages 325-70, October.
  3. Theo Offerman & Jan Potters, 2006. "Does Auctioning of Entry Licences Induce Collusion? An Experimental Study," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 73(3), pages 769-791.
  4. Cox, James C. & Smith, Vernon L. & Walker, James M., 1982. "Auction market theory of heterogeneous bidders," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 319-325.
  5. David Easley & Maureen O'Hara, 2009. "Ambiguity and Nonparticipation: The Role of Regulation," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(5), pages 1817-1843, May.
  6. Axel Ockenfels & Reinhard Selten, 2002. "Impulse Balance Equilibrium and Feedback in First Price Auctions," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-12, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
  7. Hogarth, Robin M & Kunreuther, Howard, 1985. "Ambiguity and Insurance Decisions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(2), pages 386-90, May.
  8. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
  9. Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, . "Value Versus Growth: The International Evidence," CRSP working papers 449, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
  10. Esö, Péter & White, Lucy, 2003. "Precautionary Bidding in Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 3975, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  11. Yoram Halevy, 2007. "Ellsberg Revisited: An Experimental Study," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(2), pages 503-536, 03.
  12. Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel & Timothy C. Salmon, 2004. "Bidder Preferences Among Auction Institutions," Experimental 0404005, EconWPA.
  13. Raman Uppal & Tan Wang, 2003. "Model Misspecification and Underdiversification," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(6), pages 2465-2486, December.
  14. Charles A. Holt & Susan K. Laury, 2002. "Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1644-1655, December.
  15. Julian Jamison & Dean S. Karlan, 2005. "When Curiosity Kills the Profits: an Experimental Examination," Experimental 0505001, EconWPA.
  16. Janssen, Maarten C.W. & Karamychev, Vladimir A., 2007. "Selection effects in auctions for monopoly rights," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 576-582, May.
  17. Kahn, Barbara E & Sarin, Rakesh K, 1988. " Modeling Ambiguity in Decisions under Uncertainty," Journal of Consumer Research, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(2), pages 265-72, September.
  18. Huang, Rocco R., 2007. "Distance and trade: Disentangling unfamiliarity effects and transport cost effects," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 161-181, January.
  19. Camerer, Colin & Kunreuther, Howard, 1989. " Experimental Markets for Insurance," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 265-99, September.
  20. Charness, Gary & Gneezy, Uri, 2003. "Portfolio Choice and Risk Attitudes: An Experiment," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt7vz7w609, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
  21. Grimm, Veronika & Schmidt, Ulrich, 1998. "Equilibrium bidding without the independence axiom: A graphical analysis," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 1999,40, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
  22. Peter P. Wakker & Daniëlle R. M. Timmermans & Irma Machielse, 2007. "The Effects of Statistical Information on Risk and Ambiguity Attitudes, and on Rational Insurance Decisions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 53(11), pages 1770-1784, November.
  23. Ganesh Iyer & Amit Pazgal, 2008. "Procurement bidding with restrictions," Quantitative Marketing and Economics, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 177-204, June.
  24. Neugebauer, Tibor & Selten, Reinhard, 2006. "Individual behavior of first-price auctions: The importance of information feedback in computerized experimental markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 183-204, January.
  25. Fox, Craig R & Tversky, Amos, 1995. "Ambiguity Aversion and Comparative Ignorance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 110(3), pages 585-603, August.
  26. Dufwenberg, Martin & Gneezy, Uri, 2002. "Information disclosure in auctions: an experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 48(4), pages 431-444, August.
  27. Chen, Yan & Katuscak, Peter & Ozdenoren, Emre, 2007. "Sealed bid auctions with ambiguity: Theory and experiments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 513-535, September.
  28. Salo, Ahti A & Weber, Martin, 1995. "Ambiguity Aversion in First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 123-37, September.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:51:y:2013:i:1:p:882-895. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christopher F. Baum)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.