Electoral accountability in a country with two-tiered government
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KeywordsMoral hazard; Separation of powers; Stackelberg; Transparency; Voting theory; D72; H00; H77;
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H00 - Public Economics - - General - - - General
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
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