IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/mhr/finarc/urnsici0015-2218(200609)623_437epaoti_2.0.tx_2-y.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Environmental Policy and Optimal Taxation in a Decentralized Economic Federation

Author

Listed:
  • Thomas Aronsson Aronsson
  • Thomas Jonsson
  • Tomas Sjögren

Abstract

This paper deals with environmental policy in an economic federation, where each national (lower level) government faces a mixed tax problem. We assume that the federal government sets emission targets, which are implemented at the national level. We also assume that the economic federation is decentralized, meaning that the national governments are first movers vis-à-vis the federal government. Our results show that each country uses its policy instruments, at least in part, to influence the emission target. This has several implications: first, the commodity taxes do not satisfy the so-called additivity property often emphasized in earlier literature, and, second, it provides an argument for using distortionary labor income taxation.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas Aronsson Aronsson & Thomas Jonsson & Tomas Sjögren, 2006. "Environmental Policy and Optimal Taxation in a Decentralized Economic Federation," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 62(3), pages 437-454, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:mhr:finarc:urn:sici:0015-2218(200609)62:3_437:epaoti_2.0.tx_2-y DOI: 10.1628/001522106X153464
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/mohr/fa/2006/00000062/00000003/art00008
    Download Restriction: Fulltext access is included for subscribers to the printed version.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sören Blomquist & Luca Micheletto, 2008. "Age-related Optimal Income Taxation," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 110(1), pages 45-71, March.
    2. Aronsson, Thomas & Blomquist, Soren, 2003. "Optimal taxation, global externalities and labor mobility," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(12), pages 2749-2764, December.
    3. Clemens Fuest & Bernd Huber, 1997. "Wage bargaining, labor-tax progression, and welfare," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 66(2), pages 127-150, June.
    4. Thomas Aronsson & Tomas Sjögren, 2004. "Is the Optimal Labor Income Tax Progressive in a Unionized Economy?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 106(4), pages 661-675, December.
    5. Christiansen, Vidar, 1984. "Which commodity taxes should supplement the income tax?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 195-220, July.
    6. Barrett, Scott, 1994. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 878-894, Supplemen.
    7. Aronsson, Thomas & Sjogren, Tomas, 2004. "Efficient taxation, wage bargaining and policy coordination," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(12), pages 2711-2725, December.
    8. Marklund, Per-Olov & Samakovlis, Eva, 2003. "What is Driving the EU Burden-Sharing Agreement: Efficiency or Equity?," Umeå Economic Studies 620, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
    9. Frederick Ploeg & Aart Zeeuw, 1992. "International aspects of pollution control," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 2(2), pages 117-139, March.
    10. Caplan, Arthur J. & Silva, Emilson C. D., 1999. "Federal Acid Rain Games," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 25-52, July.
    11. Thomas Aronsson & Thomas Jonsson & Tomas Sjögren, 2006. "International Environmental Policy Reforms, Tax Distortions, and the Labor Market," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 62(2), pages 199-217, June.
    12. Kothenburger, Marko, 2004. "Tax competition in a fiscal union with decentralized leadership," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 498-513, May.
    13. Silva, Emilson C. D. & Caplan, Arthur J., 1997. "Transboundary Pollution Control in Federal Systems," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 173-186, October.
    14. Aronsson, Thomas & Jonsson, Thomas & Sjögren, Tomas, 2004. "Environmental Policy Reforms and the Labor Market in a Global Economy," Umeå Economic Studies 629, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
    15. Caplan, Arthur J. & Cornes, Richard C. & Silva, Emilson C. D., 2000. "Pure public goods and income redistribution in a federation with decentralized leadership and imperfect labor mobility," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 265-284, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Aronsson, Thomas & Persson, Lars, 2012. "Decentralized fiscal federalism revisited: Optimal income taxation and public goods under horizontal leadership," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 223-226.
    2. Aronsson, Thomas & Sjögren, Tomas & Witterblad, Mikael, 2008. "Optimal Taxation and Asymmetric Information in an Economy with Second-Hand Trade," Umeå Economic Studies 732, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
    3. Aronsson, Thomas & Micheletto, Luca & Sjögren, Tomas, 2012. "Public Goods in a Voluntary Federal Union: Implications of a Participation Constraint," Umeå Economic Studies 850, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
    4. Sjögren, Tomas, 2017. "Capital Taxation in a Fiscal Union – Implications of Simultaneous Horizontal and Decentralized Leadership," Umeå Economic Studies 947, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
    5. Lars Persson, 2015. "Incentives underlying tax policies in a decentralized federation with horizontal leadership and transboundary environmental damage," Letters in Spatial and Resource Sciences, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 77-88, March.
    6. Aronsson, Thomas, 2007. "General Income Taxation, Public Goods and Decentralized Leadership," Umeå Economic Studies 715, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
    7. Aronsson, Thomas & Sjögren, Tomas, 2017. "Optimal Taxation, Redistribution, and Environmental Externalities," Umeå Economic Studies 950, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
    8. Aronsson, Thomas & Persson, Lars & Sjögren, Tomas, 2006. "Optimal Taxation and Transboundary Externalities - Are Endogenous World Market Prices Important?," Umeå Economic Studies 699, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
    9. Aronsson, Thomas & Micheletto, Luca & Sjögren, Tomas, 2014. "A note on public goods in a decentralized fiscal union: Implications of a participation constraint," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 1-8.
    10. David Granlund, 2011. "Electoral accountability in a country with two-tiered government," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(3), pages 531-546, September.
    11. Aronsson, Thomas, 2010. "Optimal income taxation and decentralized fiscal federalism," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(4), pages 187-195, July.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    income and commodity taxation; economic federation; environmental policy;

    JEL classification:

    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mhr:finarc:urn:sici:0015-2218(200609)62:3_437:epaoti_2.0.tx_2-y. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Wolpert). General contact details of provider: https://www.mohr.de/fa .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.