IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hhs/umnees/0850.html

Public Goods in a Voluntary Federal Union: Implications of a Participation Constraint

Author

Listed:
  • Aronsson, Thomas

    (Department of Economics, Umeå School of Business and Economics)

  • Micheletto, Luca

    (Department of Policy Analysis and Public Management)

  • Sjögren, Tomas

    (Department of Economics, Umeå School of Business and Economics)

Abstract

This paper re-examines the question of whether federal ex-post redistribution in terms of public funds leads to under-provision of public goods by adding the assumption that the member states are free to leave the economic federation. We show that federal ex-post redistribution no longer necessarily means under-provision of local and federal public goods.

Suggested Citation

  • Aronsson, Thomas & Micheletto, Luca & Sjögren, Tomas, 2012. "Public Goods in a Voluntary Federal Union: Implications of a Participation Constraint," Umeå Economic Studies 850, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:umnees:0850
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.econ.umu.se/DownloadAsset.action?contentId=200188&languageId=3&assetKey=ues850
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Andrea Brandolini & Francesca Carta & Francesco D'Amuri, 2016. "A Feasible Unemployment-Based Shock Absorber for the Euro Area," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(5), pages 1123-1141, September.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:umnees:0850. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: David Skog (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/inumuse.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.