Decentralized fiscal federalism revisited: Optimal income taxation and public goods under horizontal leadership
This paper concerns optimal taxation and public goods in an economic federation with decentralized leadership, where one lower level government is the first mover also in the horizontal dimension. Under plausible assumptions, horizontal leadership reinforces the incentives created by decentralized leadership.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Aronsson, Thomas, 2010. "Optimal income taxation and decentralized fiscal federalism," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(4), pages 187-195, July.
- Caplan, Arthur J. & Cornes, Richard C. & Silva, Emilson C. D., 2000. "Pure public goods and income redistribution in a federation with decentralized leadership and imperfect labor mobility," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 265-284, August.
- Thomas Aronsson Aronsson & Thomas Jonsson & Tomas Sjögren, 2006.
"Environmental Policy and Optimal Taxation in a Decentralized Economic Federation,"
FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis,
Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 62(3), pages 437-454, September.
- Aronsson, Thomas & Jonsson, Thomas & Sjögren, Tomas, 2006. "Environmental Policy and Optimal Taxation in a Decentralized Economic Federation," Umeå Economic Studies 669, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
- Silva, Emilson C. D. & Caplan, Arthur J., 1997. "Transboundary Pollution Control in Federal Systems," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 173-186, October.
- Caplan, Arthur J. & Silva, Emilson C. D., 1999. "Federal Acid Rain Games," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 25-52, July.
- Robin Boadway & Michael Keen, 1991.
"Public Goods, Self-Selection and Optimal Income Taxation,"
828, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Boadway, Robin & Keen, Michael, 1993. "Public Goods, Self-Selection and Optimal Income Taxation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 34(3), pages 463-78, August.
- Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1982.
"Self-selection and Pareto efficient taxation,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 213-240, March.
- Kothenburger, Marko, 2007.
"Ex-post redistribution in a federation: Implications for corrective policy,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 91(3-4), pages 481-496, April.
- Marko Köthenbürger, 2006. "Ex-Post Redistribution in a Federation: Implications for Corrective Policy," CESifo Working Paper Series 1754, CESifo Group Munich.
- Stern, Nicholas, 1982. "Optimum taxation with errors in administration," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 181-211, March.
- Marko Koethenbuerger, 2003.
"Tax Competition in a Fiscal Union with Decentralized Leadership,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
943, CESifo Group Munich.
- Kothenburger, Marko, 2004. "Tax competition in a fiscal union with decentralized leadership," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 498-513, May.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:117:y:2012:i:1:p:223-226. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.