Decentralized fiscal federalism revisited: Optimal income taxation and public goods under horizontal leadership
This paper concerns optimal taxation and public goods in an economic federation with decentralized leadership, where one lower level government is the first mover also in the horizontal dimension. Under plausible assumptions, horizontal leadership reinforces the incentives created by decentralized leadership.
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