An efficient mechanism to control correlated externalities: redistributive transfers and the coexistence of regional and global pollution permit markets
We compare tradable permit markets and emission taxes as self-enforcing mechanisms to control correlated externality problems. By “correlated” we mean multiple pollutants that are jointly produced by a single source but which simultaneously cause differentiated regional and global externalities (e.g., smog and global warming). By “self-enforcing” we mean mechanisms that account for the endogeneity that exists between competing jurisdictions in the setting of environmental policy within a federation of regions. We find that joint domestic and international permit markets are Pareto efficient, while joint emissions taxes are not.
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