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Externalities, Border Trade and Illegal Production: An Optimal Tax Approach to Alcohol Policy

Author

Listed:
  • Aronsson, Thomas

    (Department of Economics, Umeå University)

  • Sjögren, Tomas

    (Department of Economics, Umeå University)

Abstract

This paper deals with optimal income and commodity taxation in an economy, where alcohol is an externality-generating consumption good. In our model, alcohol can be bought domestically, imported (via border trade) or produced illegally. Border trade implies an incentive to set the domestic alcohol tax below the marginal social damage of alcohol, and to tax (subsidize) commodities which are complementary with (substitutable for) alcohol. In addition, since leisure and alcohol consumption are generally nonseparable, the income tax will also be used as a corrective instrument. On the other hand, the desire to reduce the illegal production may generally affect the optimal income and commodity taxes in either direction. One possible (and arguably realistic) outcome is, nevertheless, that the desire to avoid the illegal production works to reduce both the alcohol tax and the marginal income tax rate.

Suggested Citation

  • Aronsson, Thomas & Sjögren, Tomas, 2005. "Externalities, Border Trade and Illegal Production: An Optimal Tax Approach to Alcohol Policy," Umeå Economic Studies 654, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:hhs:umnees:0654
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    12. Cremer, Helmuth & Gahvari, Firouz, 2001. "Second-best taxation of emissions and polluting goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 169-197, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Katarina Nordblom, 2011. "The complex attitudes to alcohol taxation," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 43(24), pages 3355-3364.
    2. Kaisa Kotakorpi, 2009. "Paternalism and Tax Competition," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 111(1), pages 125-149, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    taxation; external effects; alcohol; border trade.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies

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