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Electoral accountability in a country with two-tiered government

Author

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  • Granlund, David

    (Department of Economics, Umeå University)

Abstract

In democracies, elections are the primary mechanism for making politicians act in voters' interests, but voters are unable to prevent that some resources are diverted to political rents. With two levels of government, the rents are reduced if voters require higher beneficial public expenditures for reelecting incumbents. Voters can also strengthen their power by holding politicians also liable for decisions made by the other level of government. When the incumbent at one level acts as a Stackelberg leader with respect to the other, there is no risk of this leading to Leviathan policies on the part of the incumbents.

Suggested Citation

  • Granlund, David, 2009. "Electoral accountability in a country with two-tiered government," Umeå Economic Studies 786, Umeå University, Department of Economics, revised 10 Jun 2010.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:umnees:0786
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    Cited by:

    1. David Granlund, 2011. "Electoral accountability in a country with two-tiered government," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(3), pages 531-546, September.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    moral hazard; separation of powers; Stackelberg; transparency; voting theory;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H00 - Public Economics - - General - - - General
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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