IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/pubcho/v146y2011i1p145-162.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Loyalty and competence in public agencies

Author

Listed:
  • Alexander Wagner

    ()

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Alexander Wagner, 2011. "Loyalty and competence in public agencies," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 146(1), pages 145-162, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:146:y:2011:i:1:p:145-162 DOI: 10.1007/s11127-009-9587-8
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11127-009-9587-8
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. La Porta, Rafael & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1997. " Legal Determinants of External Finance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(3), pages 1131-1150, July.
    2. Kofman, Fred & Lawarree, Jacques, 1993. "Collusion in Hierarchical Agency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, pages 629-656.
    3. Barro, Robert J. & Lee, Jong-Wha, 1993. "International comparisons of educational attainment," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 363-394, December.
    4. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1998. "Law and Finance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(6), pages 1113-1155, December.
    5. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Zantman, Wilfried, 2002. "Information acquisition, political game and the delegation of authority," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 407-428, September.
    6. Prendergast, Canice & Topel, Robert H, 1996. "Favoritism in Organizations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(5), pages 958-978, October.
    7. Breton, Albert, 1995. "Organizational hierarchies and bureaucracies: An integrative essay," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 411-440, September.
    8. Lars-Erik Borge & Torberg Falch & Per Tovmo, 2008. "Public sector efficiency: the roles of political and budgetary institutions, fiscal capacity, and democratic participation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 136(3), pages 475-495, September.
    9. repec:hrv:faseco:30728041 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Van Rijckeghem, Caroline & Weder, Beatrice, 2001. "Bureaucratic corruption and the rate of temptation: do wages in the civil service affect corruption, and by how much?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 307-331, August.
    11. VafaI, Kouroche, 2005. "Abuse of authority and collusion in organizations," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 385-405, June.
    12. Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 181-214, Fall.
    13. Dittmann, Ingolf, 1999. "How reliable should auditors be?: optimal monitoring in principal-agent relationships," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 523-546, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Kouroche Vafaï, 2012. "Information in Hierarchies," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00768904, HAL.
    2. repec:hal:journl:halshs-00768904 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Kouroche Vafaï, 2012. "Information in Hierarchies," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 12086, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public agencies; Political economy; Loyalty; H1; M5; P1;

    JEL classification:

    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • M5 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics
    • P1 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:146:y:2011:i:1:p:145-162. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.