Another look at anti-scalping laws: Theory and evidence
This paper investigates the impact of anti-scalping laws on the face value of tickets in professional football and baseball. Previous theoretical models have suggested that scalpers might cause an increase in prices at the ticket window because they represent an increase in demand. This paper provides a model in which ticket scalping has an ambiguous impact on ticket window prices, making the actual impact an empirical question. Empirical analysis suggest that in cities with anti-scalping laws average per-game season ticket prices are approximately $2 greater in baseball and $10 greater in football. Anti-scalping laws actually increase team revenues, as the laws have no adverse effect on attendance. Thus, event promoters might have sufficient pecuniary incentive to tacitly or explicitly support anti-scalping legislation. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2007
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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Courty, Pascal, 2003.
"Ticket Pricing under Demand Uncertainty,"
Journal of Law and Economics,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 46(2), pages 627-52, October.
- Larry Karp & Jeffrey M. Perloff, 2005.
"When Promoters Like Scalpers,"
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Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(2), pages 477-508, 06.
- Karp, Larry S. & Perloff, Jeffrey M, 2003. "When promoters like scalpers," CUDARE Working Paper Series 916R, University of California at Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Policy.
- Karp, Larry & Perloff, Jeffrey M., 2003. "When Promoters Like Scalpers," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt52d579j4, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
- repec:cdl:agrebk:9855 is not listed on IDEAS
- Davidson, Russell & MacKinnon, James G., 1993. "Estimation and Inference in Econometrics," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195060119.
- Dennis Coates & Brad R. Humphreys, 2005. "Novelty Effects Of New Facilities On Attendance At Professional Sporting Events," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 23(3), pages 436-455, 07.
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