Flexible and Committed Profit Sharing with Wage Bargaining: Implications for Equilibrium Unemployment
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Volume (Year): 87 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (03)
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- Erkki Koskela & Rune Stenbacka, 2004. "Profit Sharing and Unemployment: An Approach with Bargaining and Efficiency-Wage Effects," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 160(3), pages 477-477, September.
- Nickell, Stephen & Layard, Richard, 1999.
"Labor market institutions and economic performance,"
Handbook of Labor Economics,in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 46, pages 3029-3084
- Nickell, S. & Layard, R., 1997. "Labour Market Institutions and Economic Performance," Papers 23, Centre for Economic Performance & Institute of Economics.
- Richard Layard & Stephen Nickell, 1998. "Labour Market Institutions and Economic Performance," CEP Discussion Papers dp0407, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.