eBay auctions for Third Eye Blind concert tickets
The band Third Eye Blind recently completed a tour, selling tickets exclusively on eBay. Many tickets were bundled with either VIP passes or autographed posters. These data are used to measure variations in price across different markets, as well as the premiums paid for different ticket types. Auctioning the tickets allows the seller to practice Third Degree Price Discrimination and bundling, without having to determine prices in each market and for each different bundle. We find: tickets bundled with VIP passes command a substantial positive premium; tickets bundled with autographed posters command a small negative premium; different prices emerge in different geographic markets; and auction prices are positively related to the fixed price at which tickets could be purchased by way of Buy-it-Now. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007
Volume (Year): 31 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.springer.com|
Web page: http://www.culturaleconomics.org/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/10824/PS2|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Orley Ashenfelter & David Genesove, 1992.
"Testing for Price Anomalies in Real Estate Auctions,"
NBER Working Papers
4036, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Ashenfelter, Orley & Genesove, David, 1992. "Testing for Price Anomalies in Real-Estate Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(2), pages 501-05, May.
- Ashenfelter, O. & Genesove, D., 1992. "Testing for Price Anomalies in real Estate Auctions," Papers 128, Princeton, Department of Economics - Financial Research Center.
- Ashenfelter, O. & Genesove, D., 1992. "Testing for Price Anomalies in Real Estate Auctions," Working papers 92-2, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Alvin E. Roth & Axel Ockenfels, 2002.
"Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the Internet,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1093-1103, September.
- Alvin E. Roth & Axel Ockenfels, . "Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the Internet," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-32, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
- Pascal Courty, 2003. "Some Economics of Ticket Resale," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(2), pages 85-97, Spring.
- Cynthia G. McDonald & V. Carlos Slawson, 2002. "Reputation in An Internet Auction Market," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 40(4), pages 633-650, October.
- Young Han Lee & Ulrike Malmendier, 2007.
"The Bidder's Curse,"
NBER Working Papers
13699, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Ashenfelter, Orley, 1989. "How Auctions Work for Wine and Art," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 23-36, Summer.
- McAfee R. Preston & Vincent Daniel, 1993. "The Declining Price Anomaly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 191-212, June.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:jculte:v:31:y:2007:i:1:p:65-78. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Rebekah McClure)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.