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eBay auctions for Third Eye Blind concert tickets

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  • Dennis Halcoussis
  • Timothy Mathews

Abstract

The band Third Eye Blind recently completed a tour, selling tickets exclusively on eBay. Many tickets were bundled with either VIP passes or autographed posters. These data are used to measure variations in price across different markets, as well as the premiums paid for different ticket types. Auctioning the tickets allows the seller to practice Third Degree Price Discrimination and bundling, without having to determine prices in each market and for each different bundle. We find: tickets bundled with VIP passes command a substantial positive premium; tickets bundled with autographed posters command a small negative premium; different prices emerge in different geographic markets; and auction prices are positively related to the fixed price at which tickets could be purchased by way of Buy-it-Now. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007

Suggested Citation

  • Dennis Halcoussis & Timothy Mathews, 2007. "eBay auctions for Third Eye Blind concert tickets," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 31(1), pages 65-78, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:jculte:v:31:y:2007:i:1:p:65-78
    DOI: 10.1007/s10824-006-9028-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    6. McAfee R. Preston & Vincent Daniel, 1993. "The Declining Price Anomaly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 191-212, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Feess, Eberhard & Grund, Christian & Walzl, Markus & Wohlschlegel, Ansgar, 2020. "Competing trade mechanisms and monotone mechanism choice," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 280(3), pages 1108-1121.
    2. Liu, Kang Ernest & Shiu, Ji-Liang & Sun, Chia-Hung, 2013. "How different are consumers in Internet auction markets? Evidence from Japan and Taiwan," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 1-12.
    3. Courty, Pascal & Pagliero, Mario, 2012. "The Pricing of Art and the Art of Pricing: Pricing Styles in the Concert Industry," CEPR Discussion Papers 8967, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Ulrike Malmendier & Young Han Lee, 2011. "The Bidder's Curse," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(2), pages 749-787, April.
    5. Michael Rushton, 2011. "Pricing the Arts," Chapters, in: Ruth Towse (ed.), A Handbook of Cultural Economics, Second Edition, chapter 49, Edward Elgar Publishing.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Auctions ; Cultural economics; D44; Z10;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • Z10 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - General

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