IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/ecinqu/v40y2002i4p633-650.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Reputation in An Internet Auction Market

Author

Listed:
  • Cynthia G. McDonald
  • V. Carlos Slawson

Abstract

We investigate how market participants possessing varying degrees of anonymity reduce asymmetric information costs in an electronic auction market using a quantifiable measure of reputation. The data suggest that purchasers in this self-enforcing market use reputation to price information asymmetries associated with counterparty risks. The results provide direct empirical evidence of an economic incentive for investing in reputation. The continually observable feedback of participants indicates that high seller reputation signals preferred traits, including advertised service accuracy, product description accuracy, delivery efficiency, and posttransaction communication. Despite some imperfections, the reputation measure represents clear differences in expected performance between high-reputation and low-reputation counterparties. Copyright 2002, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Cynthia G. McDonald & V. Carlos Slawson, 2002. "Reputation in An Internet Auction Market," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 40(4), pages 633-650, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:40:y:2002:i:4:p:633-650
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:40:y:2002:i:4:p:633-650. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press) or (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/weaaaea.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.