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Upstream and downstream pollution taxations in vertically related markets with imperfect competition

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  • Hajime Sugeta
  • Shigeru Matsumoto

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  • Hajime Sugeta & Shigeru Matsumoto, 2007. "Upstream and downstream pollution taxations in vertically related markets with imperfect competition," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 38(3), pages 407-432, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:38:y:2007:i:3:p:407-432
    DOI: 10.1007/s10640-007-9085-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Diamond, Peter A & Mirrlees, James A, 1971. "Optimal Taxation and Public Production: I--Production Efficiency," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(1), pages 8-27, March.
    2. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, April.
    3. Levin, Dan, 1985. "Taxation within Cournot oligopoly," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 281-290, August.
    4. Varian, Hal R, 1985. "Price Discrimination and Social Welfare," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 870-875, September.
    5. Lahiri, Sajal & Ono, Yoshiyasu, 1988. "Helping Minor Firms Reduces Welfare," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 98(393), pages 1199-1202, December.
    6. Hajime Sugeta & Shigeru Matsumoto, 2005. "Green Tax Reform in an Oligopolistic Industry," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 31(3), pages 253-274, July.
    7. Schmutzler, Armin & Goulder, Lawrence H., 1997. "The Choice between Emission Taxes and Output Taxes under Imperfect Monitoring," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 51-64, January.
    8. Bovenberg, A. Lans & Goulder, Lawrence H., 2002. "Environmental taxation and regulation," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 23, pages 1471-1545, Elsevier.
    9. Giuseppe Colangelo & Umberto Galmarini, 2001. "Ad Valorem Taxation on Intermediate Goods in Oligopoly," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 8(1), pages 53-73, January.
    10. R. Simpson, 1995. "Optimal pollution taxation in a Cournot duopoly," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 6(4), pages 359-369, December.
    11. Dixit, Avinash K, 1986. "Comparative Statics for Oligopoly," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 27(1), pages 107-122, February.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Chiara Franco & Giovanni Marin, 2017. "The Effect of Within-Sector, Upstream and Downstream Environmental Taxes on Innovation and Productivity," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 66(2), pages 261-291, February.
    2. Kenji Fujiwara, 2020. "Revenue-Neutral Tax Reform in Vertically Related Markets," Discussion Paper Series 207, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University.
    3. Sedakov, Artem & Qiao, Han & Wang, Shouyang, 2021. "A model of river pollution as a dynamic game with network externalities," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 290(3), pages 1136-1153.
    4. Francesco Silvestri, 2017. "Competition and environmental quality as conflicting objectives: the case of the European municipal waste industry," Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer;Fondazione Edison, vol. 34(3), pages 491-513, December.
    5. Hajime Sugeta & Takayoshi Shinkuma, 2012. "International trade in recycled materials in vertically related markets," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 14(4), pages 357-382, October.
    6. Francesco Gullì, 2011. "The interaction between emissions trading and energy and competition policies," RSCAS Working Papers 2011/20, European University Institute.
    7. Shuichi Ohori, 2012. "Environmental Tax and Public Ownership in Vertically Related Markets," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 169-176, June.
    8. Marc St‐Pierre & Aaron A. Elrod, 2022. "The perverse effect of environmental regulation on emissions: The role of product‐mix changes," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 24(1), pages 197-235, February.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Input price discrimination; Abatement heterogeneity; Pollution taxation; Green tax reform; Q58; H23; D43;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

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