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The determinants of rent extraction in the parent-subsidiary relation

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  • Klaus Gugler

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Abstract

A recurring problem in financial development is to understand which poor quality institutions lead to substantial rent extraction by controllers. When rent extraction is high and its extent difficult to predict, outside investment in firms may decline. Recent work has emphasized the quality of the legal system and the overall quality of political institutions as explaining the degree to which rent extraction can occur. Here we exploit a comprehensive parent-subsidiary data-set to shed light on these questions. Using the relation between parent and subsidiary Tobin’s Q to measure the extent of parent companies’ rent extraction from partially-owned subsidiaries, the results indicate that governmental quality, legal origin, rules on self-dealing and political stability all predict the degree of rent extraction. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Klaus Gugler, 2013. "The determinants of rent extraction in the parent-subsidiary relation," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 40(2), pages 343-362, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:empiri:v:40:y:2013:i:2:p:343-362
    DOI: 10.1007/s10663-012-9189-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corporate governance; Tunneling; Rent extraction; Political stability; Legal systems; Parent-subsidiary relationships; Cross-border investment; Economic and financial development; Investor protection; D21; G3; G18; G28; G32; G34; G38; K22; O16; P3;

    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
    • O16 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance
    • P3 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions

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