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Bad banks: a proposal based on German financial history

  • Ulrich Suntum

    ()

  • Cordelius Ilgmann

    ()

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    In conventional bad bank models, the estimated fundamental value of the illiquid assets is paid to the ailing bank, thereby leaving considerable economic risk with the asset management company. In this paper, a different approach is proposed which combines the bad bank solution with equalization claims, an instrument that has successfully been used in two previous German debt crises. The main idea is to temporarily swap toxic assets for government bonds with an open maturity date. This approach not only leaves total losses with the banks, but also avoids the problem of evaluating the toxic assets in advance. The current German bad bank legislation largely follows this idea, but suffers severely from unnecessary complexity and lack of participation by commercial banks. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013

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    Article provided by Springer in its journal European Journal of Law and Economics.

    Volume (Year): 35 (2013)
    Issue (Month): 3 (June)
    Pages: 367-384

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    Handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:35:y:2013:i:3:p:367-384
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