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EU Bank Packages: Objectives and Potential Conflicts of Objectives


  • Michaela Posch

    () (Oesterreichische Nationalbank)

  • Stefan W. Schmitz

    () (Oesterreichische Nationalbank)

  • Beat Weber

    () (Oesterreichische Nationalbank)


Any attempt to resolve a systemic financial crisis inherently involves conflicts of objectives. In the following article, we identify and elaborate on the conflicts of objectives embodied in the EU bank packages. Building on this, we then analyze how the EU Member States and the EU institutions are dealing with these conflicts of objectives. The empirical basis of our analysis comprises the explicit objectives of the EU bank packages and the details of the bank packages of the individual Member States. Our main findings are: (1) Although much effort has been extended to ensure a harmonized EU approach, the Member States in fact enjoy great leeway in designing national bank packages, which leads to competitive distortion. (2) In the conflict between fiscal objectives and micro- and macroeconomic objectives, the latter have been afforded priority. The bank packages entail passing on the costs of overcoming the crisis to the taxpayers, while the banks’ creditors are not required to make a contribution. (3) As a result, short-term financial stability is favored over long-term stability in the conflict between these two objectives. (4) Some attempts have been made to resolve these conflicts of objectives by attaching conditions to state aid. Our analysis indicates first of all, that under certain circumstances conditions such as dividend restrictions, state influence on company management and salary caps may be consistent with all of the objectives specified, and second, that requirements to maintain lending and solve borrowers’ debt problems are themselves subject to unavoidable conflicts of objectives.

Suggested Citation

  • Michaela Posch & Stefan W. Schmitz & Beat Weber, 2009. "EU Bank Packages: Objectives and Potential Conflicts of Objectives," Financial Stability Report, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank), issue 17, pages 63-84.
  • Handle: RePEc:onb:oenbfs:y:2009:i:17:b:2

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Hakenes, Hendrik & Schnabel, Isabel, 2011. "Bank size and risk-taking under Basel II," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(6), pages 1436-1449, June.
    2. Eva Catarineu-Rabell & Patricia Jackson & Dimitrios Tsomocos, 2005. "Procyclicality and the new Basel Accord - banks’ choice of loan rating system," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 26(3), pages 537-557, October.
    3. Roger Aliaga-Diaz, 2005. "General Equilibrium Implications of the Capital Adequacy Regulation for Banks," Computing in Economics and Finance 2005 238, Society for Computational Economics.
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    Cited by:

    1. Wald Nowotny, 2013. "The Economics of Financial Regulation," Chapters,in: Stability of the Financial System, chapter 15 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. Ulrich Suntum & Cordelius Ilgmann, 2013. "Bad banks: a proposal based on German financial history," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 35(3), pages 367-384, June.
    3. repec:onb:oenbfi:y:2007:i:0:b:13 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. repec:onb:oenbfi:y:2007:i:5:b:13 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item


    Financial crisis; bank packages;

    JEL classification:

    • D53 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Financial Markets
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • F36 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation


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