Constitutional choice and European immigration policy
The EU’s immigration policy is evaluated from the standpoint of constitutional economics. The main conclusion is that European immigration policy is trapped in a system of constitutional regulations that is too rigid as it is exclusively oriented towards the protection and securitisation of European borders. As such, it is not capable of allowing the development of a problem-solving capacity based on successive trials, and this produces negative outcomes for the whole of the EU. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2007
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Wellisch, Dietmar & Walz, Uwe, 1998. "Why do rich countries prefer free trade over free migration? The role of the modern welfare state," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(8), pages 1595-1612, September.
- George J. Borjas, 1994.
"The Economic Benefits from Immigration,"
NBER Working Papers
4955, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Virginie Guiraudon, 2000. "European Integration and Migration Policy: Vertical Policy-making as Venue Shopping," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(2), pages 251-271, 06.
- Sapir, Andre & Aghion, Philippe & Bertola, Giuseppe & Hellwig, Martin & Pisani-Ferry, Jean & Rosati, Dariusz & Vinals, Jose & Wallace, Helen, 2004.
"An Agenda for a Growing Europe: The Sapir Report,"
Oxford University Press, number 9780199271498, March.
- André Sapir & Philippe Aghion & Giuseppe Bertola & Martin Hellwig & Jean Pisani-Ferry & Bernard Lange & José Viñals & Helen Wallace & Marco Buti & Mario Nava & Peter Smith, 2004. "An agenda for a growing Europe: the Sapir report," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/8070, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Bauer, Thomas K. & Lofstrom, Magnus & Zimmermann, Klaus F., 2000. "Immigration Policy, Assimilation of Immigrants and Natives' Sentiments towards Immigrants: Evidence from 12 OECD-Countries," IZA Discussion Papers 187, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Voigt, Stefan, 1997. " Positive Constitutional Economics: A Survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 90(1-4), pages 11-53, March.
- Jef Huysmans, 2000. "The European Union and the Securitization of Migration," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(5), pages 751-777, December.
- Boeri, Tito & Hanson, Gordon H. & McCormick, Barry (ed.), 2002. "Immigration Policy and the Welfare System: A Report for the Fondazione Rodolfo Debenedetti," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199256310, March.
- Mayda, Anna Maria, 2005. "Who is Against Immigration? A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes Towards Immigration," CEPR Discussion Papers 5055, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Michael J. Trebilcock, 2003. "The Law and Economics of Immigration Policy," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(2), pages 271-317, August.
- Hillman, Arye L. & Weiss, Avi, 1999. "A theory of permissible illegal immigration," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 585-604, November.
- Schiff, Maurice, 2002. "Love thy neighbor: trade, migration, and social capital," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 87-107, March.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:18:y:2007:i:1:p:1-20. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.