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Adoption and policy implications of Japan’s new corporate governance practices after the reform

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  • Masao Nakamura

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  • Masao Nakamura, 2011. "Adoption and policy implications of Japan’s new corporate governance practices after the reform," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 187-213, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:asiapa:v:28:y:2011:i:1:p:187-213
    DOI: 10.1007/s10490-010-9230-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren, 2005. "Unnatural Selection: Perverse Incentives and the Misallocation of Credit in Japan," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 1144-1166, September.
    2. Sanford M. Jacoby, 2005. "Business and Society in Japan and the United States," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 43(4), pages 617-634, December.
    3. Toru Yoshikawa & Jean McGuire, 2008. "Change and continuity in Japanese corporate governance," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 5-24, January.
    4. Renee B. Adams & Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 2010. "The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 48(1), pages 58-107, March.
    5. Jun‐Koo Kang & Anil Shivdasani & Takeshi Yamada, 2000. "The Effect of Bank Relations on Investment Decisions: An Investigation of Japanese Takeover Bids," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 55(5), pages 2197-2218, October.
    6. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-783, June.
    7. Bebchuk, Lucian A. & Cohen, Alma, 2005. "The costs of entrenched boards," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(2), pages 409-433, November.
    8. repec:hrv:faseco:30728046 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Singleton, W. R. & Globerman, Steven, 2002. "The changing nature of financial disclosure in Japan," The International Journal of Accounting, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 95-111.
    10. Inoue, Kotaro & Kato, Hideaki Kiyoshi & Bremer, Marc, 2008. "Corporate restructuring in Japan: Who monitors the monitor?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(12), pages 2628-2635, December.
    11. repec:hrv:faseco:30747162 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. ARIKAWA Yasuhiro & MITSUSADA Yosuke, 2008. "The Adoption of Poison Pills and Managerial Entrenchment: Evidence from Japan," Discussion papers 08006, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
    13. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez‐De‐Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 1999. "Corporate Ownership Around the World," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(2), pages 471-517, April.
    14. Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 2003. "Boards of directors as an endogenously determined institution: a survey of the economic literature," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 9(Apr), pages 7-26.
    15. Lin, Bing-Xuan & Michayluk, David & Oppenheimer, Henry R. & Reid, Sean F., 2008. "Hubris amongst Japanese bidders," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 16(1-2), pages 121-159, January.
    16. Randall Morck & Masao Nakamura, 1999. "Banks and Corporate Control in Japan," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(1), pages 319-339, February.
    17. Yeh, Tsung-ming & Hoshino, Yasuo, 2002. "Productivity and operating performance of Japanese merging firms: Keiretsu-related and independent mergers," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 347-366, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Nikolay Naydenov, 2014. "Recent Trends in Japanese Corporate Governance," Economic Studies journal, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute, issue 1, pages 88-115.
    2. Wali Ullah, 2017. "Evolving corporate governance and firms performance: evidence from Japanese firms," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 1-33, February.
    3. John Buchanan & Dominic H. Chai & Simon Deakin, 2018. "Unexpected Corporate Outcomes from Hedge Find Activism in Japan," Working Papers wp494, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
    4. Yasuhiro Yamakawa & Mike W. Peng & David L. Deeds, 2015. "Rising from the Ashes: Cognitive Determinants of Venture Growth after Entrepreneurial Failure," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 39(2), pages 209-236, March.
    5. Steven Globerman & Mike Peng & Daniel Shapiro, 2011. "Corporate governance and Asian companies," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 1-14, March.

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