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Collectivism, individualism, and outgroup cooperation in a segmented China

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  • Bradley Koch
  • Pamela Koch

Abstract

A consistent theme in cross-cultural management research is that collectivists are more cooperative than individualists. We use Hofstede's measure for individualism–collectivism and combine it with an experimental measure of cooperation to test this relationship in China. In contrast to the established paradigm, we find that groups with higher individualistic scores are more cooperative than those groups with higher collectivistic scores. We attribute these results to groups being composed of outgroup members. In addition, we find that subjects from the more developed coastal area are more individualistic and cooperative than are subjects from inland China. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2007

Suggested Citation

  • Bradley Koch & Pamela Koch, 2007. "Collectivism, individualism, and outgroup cooperation in a segmented China," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 207-225, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:asiapa:v:24:y:2007:i:2:p:207-225
    DOI: 10.1007/s10490-006-9004-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Liu, Min-Ling & Liu, Na-Ting & Ding, Cherng G. & Lin, Chieh-Peng, 2015. "Exploring team performance in high-tech industries: Future trends of building up teamwork," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 295-310.
    2. Yan Liu & Long Lam & Raymond Loi, 2014. "Examining professionals’ identification in the workplace: The roles of organizational prestige, work-unit prestige, and professional status," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 31(3), pages 789-810, September.

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