The Individual Behavior in a Public Goods game
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Other versions of this item:
- Walid Hichri, 2005. "The individual behaviour in a public goods game," International Review on Public and Nonprofit Marketing, Springer;International Association of Public and Non-Profit Marketing, vol. 2(1), pages 59-71, June.
References listed on IDEAS
- Claudia Keser & Roy Gardner, 1999.
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- Chan, Kenneth S. & Godby, Rob & Mestelman, Stuart & Muller, R. Andrew, 1997. "Equity theory and the voluntary provision of public goods," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 349-364, March.
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More about this item
KeywordsPublic Goods; Free-Riding; Aggregate level; Individual Behavior; Experiments.;
- H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-CBE-2005-04-16 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2005-04-16 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2005-04-16 (Public Economics)
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