Decentralized Multi-Echelon Supply Chains: Incentives and Information
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
- Amiya K. Basu & Rajiv Lal & V. Srinivasan & Richard Staelin, 1985. "Salesforce Compensation Plans: An Agency Theoretic Perspective," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 4(4), pages 267-291.
- Myerson, Roger B, 1979.
"Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem,"
Econometric Society, vol. 47(1), pages 61-73, January.
- Roger B. Myerson, 1977. "Incentive Compatability and the Bargaining Problem," Discussion Papers 284, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- James P. Monahan, 1984. "A Quantity Discount Pricing Model to Increase Vendor Profits," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 30(6), pages 720-726, June.
- Andrew J. Clark & Herbert Scarf, 2004.
"Optimal Policies for a Multi-Echelon Inventory Problem,"
INFORMS, vol. 50(12_supple), pages 1782-1790, December.
- Andrew J. Clark & Herbert Scarf, 1960. "Optimal Policies for a Multi-Echelon Inventory Problem," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 6(4), pages 475-490, July.
- Ross, Stephen A, 1973. "The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(2), pages 134-139, May.
- Maqbool Dada & K. N. Srikanth, 1987. "Pricing Policies for Quantity Discounts," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 33(10), pages 1247-1252, October.
- Groves, Theodore & Loeb, Martin, 1975. "Incentives and public inputs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 211-226, August.
- Michael H. Riordan, 1984. "Uncertainty, Asymmetric Information and Bilateral Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 51(1), pages 83-93.
- Hau L. Lee & Meir J. Rosenblatt, 1986. "A Generalized Quantity Discount Pricing Model to Increase Supplier's Profits," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 32(9), pages 1177-1185, September.
- Bengt Holmstrom, 1979. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 74-91, Spring.
More about this item
Keywordssupply chain management; incentive alignment; decentralized control; multi-echelon inventory systems; information management;
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:45:y:1999:i:5:p:633-640. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Mirko Janc). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/inforea.html .