Competition to Retain Customers
This paper contains theoretical and empirical analysis of competition to retain customers. A formal game-theoretic model suggests that large firms are likely to exhibit greater customer retention rates than their smaller rivals in equilibrium even when their (common) customer retention technology does not exhibit increasing returns to scale. This hypothesis is corroborated by an empirical analysis of competition in ordinary life insurance.
Volume (Year): 13 (1994)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.informs.org/
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:inm:ormksc:v:13:y:1994:i:2:p:165-176. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Mirko Janc)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.