The Value of Personal Information: Evidence from Empirical Economic studies
EC data protection policy is promoted with reference to economic benefits. However, the value of personal information in legitimate business models is rarely discussed. Various economic studies have tried to measure individuals' valuation of different kinds of personal data. We review empirical papers from the last 10 years and find evidence that more disclosure is associated with higher valuations. We find that the current research efforts can be extended to yield insights into the pricing of personal information, taking into account the actual value such information creates in legitimate business applications.
Volume (Year): 1 (2012)
Issue (Month): 88 (4th quarter)
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- Alastair R. Beresford & Dorothea KÃ¼bler & SÃ¶ren Preibusch, 2011.
"Unwillingness to Pay for Privacy: A Field Experiment,"
SFB 649 Discussion Papers
SFB649DP2011-010, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
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- Beresford, Alastair R. & Kübler, Dorothea & Preibusch, Sören, 2010. "Unwillingness to Pay for Privacy: A Field Experiment," IZA Discussion Papers 5017, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Beresford, Alastair R. & Kübler, Dorothea & Preibusch, Sören, 2010. "Unwillingness to pay for privacy: A field experiment," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2010-03, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
- Catherine Tucker, 2010. "Social Networks, Personalized Advertising, and Privacy Controls," Working Papers 10-07, NET Institute.
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