Does Environmental Policy with Veto Power Lead to Heterogeneous Emission? Evidence from China

Under the high-powered target responsibility system since 2007, with newly added environmental criterion, this study seeks to examine the effectiveness of the target-based performance assessment as an accelerator for local officials to be “greener”. This coercive environmental policy incorporates a stringent “one-vote” veto criterion for cadre promotion, meaning that officials who exceed emissions standards will not be promoted, no matter how outstanding their other performances are. Based on a panel data of 106 observations of provincial party secretaries from 31 provinces, this study examines how the target assessment intervenes in pollutant emissions through a new career incentive mode in China, and the conclusions are as follows: (1) Usually, provincial officials with higher political promotion incentives are characterized as a younger, lower-position cadre during the pre-stage of term, and tend to take GDP growth goals as a priority while treating environmental targets negatively. (2) Target assessment moderates the relationship between officials’ position and SO 2 emission. The use of a one-vote veto in environmental pollution assessments has led to a shift of incentive structure, as political actors prioritize environmental protection as a means of increasing their chances of promotion. (3) The moderating effect of target assessment is heterogeneous, being significant only when officials are below 60 or before the third year of their term. This study sheds light on the previously opaque motivations behind green behaviors among officials, and provides empirical support for China’s transition from a GDP-based assessment system to a green GDP-based promotion model.