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Career Trajectories Of Regional Officials: Russia And China Before And After 2012

Author

Listed:
  • Thomas F. Remington

    (National Research University Higher School of Economics)

  • Andrei A. Yakovlev

    (National Research University Higher School of Economics)

  • Elena Ovchinnikova

    (National Research University Higher School of Economics)

  • Alexander Chasovsky

    (National Research University Higher School of Economics)

Abstract

Authoritarian leaders rely on regional officials for both political support and the fulfillment of their policy objectives. Central leaders face trade-offs between using institutionalized rules for choosing regional officials such as regular rotation and performance incentives, and building a stable base of personal support from loyalists. This paper analyzes appointments of regional officials in Russia and China before and after 2012. We hypothesize that, as a consequence of the centralization and personalization of state power in both regimes over the past decade, Russia’s system for appointing regional officials has become somewhat more regularized while in China under Xi it has become somewhat less regularized. Our analysis uses a comprehensive original set of biographical data on all top regional officials from 2002 through 2019 in China and from 2000 through 2019 in Russia. We discern clear differences between the pre- and post-2012 period for China and less marked differences for pre- and post-2012 Russia

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas F. Remington & Andrei A. Yakovlev & Elena Ovchinnikova & Alexander Chasovsky, 2020. "Career Trajectories Of Regional Officials: Russia And China Before And After 2012," HSE Working papers WP BRP 754/PS/2020, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hig:wpaper:74/ps/2020
    as

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    File URL: https://wp.hse.ru/data/2020/10/23/1373846743/74PS2020.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    bureaucracy under authoritarian government; regional officials; career mobility; Russia; China;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • P21 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Planning, Coordination, and Reform
    • H83 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Public Administration
    • P27 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Performance and Prospects

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