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Does the “Miracle Drug” of Environmental Governance Really Improve Air Quality? Evidence from China’s System of Central Environmental Protection Inspections

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  • Ruxin Wu

    (School of Public Administration, Central South University, 932 Lushan South Road, Changsha 410083, China)

  • Piao Hu

    (School of Public Administration, Central South University, 932 Lushan South Road, Changsha 410083, China)

Abstract

Central environmental protection inspections have completed their goal of full coverage of 31 provinces in China, and more than 17,000 officials have been held accountable. The media has evaluated the effectiveness of central environmental protection inspections using the notions of “instant results” and the “miracle drug of environmental governance.” Can this approach effectively promote local environmental governance? This paper takes the treatment effect of central environmental protection inspections on air pollution as an example. Using the method of regression discontinuity, central environmental protection inspections are found to have a positive effect on the air quality index (AQI), but this effect is only short term and unsustainable. Additionally, there are inter-provincial differences. Judging from the research results on sub-contaminants, the treatment effect of central environmental protection inspections on air pollution is mainly reflected in PM 10 , PM 2.5 and CO. Under the current situation in which PM 10 and PM 2.5 are the main assessment indexes, this phenomenon indicates that due to the political achievements and promotion of local officials and for reasons of accountability, it is more effective for the central government to conduct specific environmental assessments through local governments than to conduct central environmental protection inspections.

Suggested Citation

  • Ruxin Wu & Piao Hu, 2019. "Does the “Miracle Drug” of Environmental Governance Really Improve Air Quality? Evidence from China’s System of Central Environmental Protection Inspections," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 16(5), pages 1-20, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jijerp:v:16:y:2019:i:5:p:850-:d:212217
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Kopyrina, Olga & Wu, Kai & Ying, Zhanyu, 2023. "Greening through central inspection: The role of legitimacy pressure and risk-taking," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
    2. Haoran Li & Min Zhou & Qing Xia & Xiaoru Hao & Jian Wang, 2022. "Has Central Environmental Protection Inspection Promoted High-Quality Economic Development?—A Case Study from China," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(18), pages 1-16, September.
    3. Song, Peng & Mao, Xianqiang & Li, Ziyan & Tan, Zhixiong, 2023. "Study on the optimal policy options for improving energy efficiency and Co-controlling carbon emission and local air pollutants in China," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 175(C).
    4. Mingze Du & Tongwei Zhang & Dehui Wang, 2023. "Can China’s Campaign-Style Environmental Regulation Improve the Green Total Factor Productivity?," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(24), pages 1-20, December.
    5. Razzaq, Asif & Sharif, Arshian & Ozturk, Ilhan & Yang, Xiaodong, 2023. "Central inspections of environmental protection and transition for low-carbon Chinese cities: Policy intervention and mechanism analysis," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 124(C).
    6. Wang, Shanyong & Zhang, Rongwei & Wan, Liang & Chen, Jiusong, 2023. "Has Central Government Environmental Protection Interview Improved Air Quality in China?," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 206(C).

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