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Get the real boss in position: Examining the environmental effect of ‘shared environmental accountability’ in China

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  • Li, Yue
  • Yu, Haowei
  • Zhang, Peng

Abstract

China implemented the Shared Environmental Accountability between Party Secretaries and Government Officials (SEA) policy in August 2015, aiming to enhance environmental enforcement by holding both the secretaries of the Communist Party of China (Party secretaries) and government officials accountable for environmental issues. This paper examines the environmental effect of the SEA policy, with a particular focus on the role of bureaucrats' personal traits. Based on city-level data from 2011 to 2021, we find that the SEA policy leads to a differential reduction in industrial SO2 emissions and energy consumption by approximately 15.9 % and 32.0 % in cities that have a higher pressure of environmental protection. We also find that the pro-environmental effect of the SEA policy is mainly realized by enhancing energy efficiency and cleaner production. More importantly, we find that the environmental effect of the SEA policy is strengthened by hometown ties if Party secretaries have promotion prospects. Further improvements in emission reduction and energy saving could be achieved if certain countermeasures were undertaken so that Party secretaries, regardless of their promotion potential, are incentivized to faithfully implement environmental regulations.

Suggested Citation

  • Li, Yue & Yu, Haowei & Zhang, Peng, 2025. "Get the real boss in position: Examining the environmental effect of ‘shared environmental accountability’ in China," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 141(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eneeco:v:141:y:2025:i:c:s0140988324007928
    DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2024.108083
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Environmental enforcement; Shared environmental accountability; Energy efficiency;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • P18 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Energy; Environment
    • P35 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Public Finance
    • Q53 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Air Pollution; Water Pollution; Noise; Hazardous Waste; Solid Waste; Recycling

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