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Monetary policy implications of greater fiscal discipline

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  • John B. Taylor

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  • John B. Taylor, 1995. "Monetary policy implications of greater fiscal discipline," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 151-170.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedkpr:y:1995:p:151-170
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Persson, Mats & Persson, Torsten & Svensson, Lars E O, 1987. "Time Consistency of Fiscal and Monetary Policy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(6), pages 1419-1431, November.
    2. Eichengreen, Barry & von Hagen, Jürgen, 1995. "Fiscal Policy and Monetary Union: Federalism, Fiscal Restrictions and the No-Bailout Rule," CEPR Discussion Papers 1247, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Thomas J. Sargent & Neil Wallace, 1984. "Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Brian Griffiths & Geoffrey E. Wood (ed.), Monetarism in the United Kingdom, pages 15-41, Palgrave Macmillan.
    4. Calvo, Guillermo A, 1988. "Servicing the Public Debt: The Role of Expectations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 647-661, September.
    5. McCallum, Bennett T, 1984. "Are Bond-Financed Deficits Inflationary? A Ricardian Analysis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(1), pages 123-135, February.
    6. Bohn, Henning, 1988. "Why do we have nominal government debt?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 127-140, January.
    7. Lucas, Robert Jr. & Stokey, Nancy L., 1983. "Optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 55-93.
    8. Taylor, John B., 1993. "Discretion versus policy rules in practice," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 195-214, December.
    9. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Andrew T.. Levin & Volker Wieland & John Williams, 1999. "Robustness of Simple Monetary Policy Rules under Model Uncertainty," NBER Chapters, in: Monetary Policy Rules, pages 263-318, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Mervyn A. King, 1996. "How should central banks reduce inflation? conceptual issues," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 53-91.
    3. Loukoianova, E. & Vahey, S.P. & Elizabeth C. Wakerly, 2002. "A Real Time Tax Smoothing Based Fiscal Policy Rule," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0235, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    4. Hasko, Harri, 2007. "Some unpleasant fiscal arithmetic: the role of monetary and fiscal policy in public debt dynamics since the 1970s," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 28/2007, Bank of Finland.
    5. Carlo A. Favero & Tommaso Monacelli, 2003. "Monetary-Fiscal Mix and Inflation Performance: Evidence from the U.S," Working Papers 234, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    6. John B. Taylor, 2000. "Reassessing Discretionary Fiscal Policy," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 21-36, Summer.
    7. Aksoy, Yunus & Orphanides, Athanasios & Small, David & Wieland, Volker & Wilcox, David, 2006. "A quantitative exploration of the opportunistic approach to disinflation," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(8), pages 1877-1893, November.
    8. Hasko, Harri, 2007. "Some unpleasant fiscal arithmetic : the role of monetary and fiscal policy in public debt dynamics since the 1970s," Research Discussion Papers 28/2007, Bank of Finland.
    9. Ms. Garima Vasishtha & Mr. Taimur Baig & Mr. Manmohan S. Kumar & Ms. Edda Zoli, 2006. "Fiscal and Monetary Nexus in Emerging Market Economies: How Does Debt Matter?," IMF Working Papers 2006/184, International Monetary Fund.
    10. Taylor, John B., 1999. "The robustness and efficiency of monetary policy rules as guidelines for interest rate setting by the European central bank," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 655-679, June.
    11. Leeper, E.M. & Leith, C., 2016. "Understanding Inflation as a Joint Monetary–Fiscal Phenomenon," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & Harald Uhlig (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 2305-2415, Elsevier.
    12. Mihaela Onofrei & Florin-Alexandru Macsim & Florin Oprea, 2017. "Determinants Of Fiscal Rules Implementation €“ An Eu Case Study," Annals of Faculty of Economics, University of Oradea, Faculty of Economics, vol. 1(1), pages 463-472, July.
    13. Rudi Dornbusch, 1998. "Debt and Monetary Policy: The Policy Issues," International Economic Association Series, in: Guillermo Calvo & Mervyn King (ed.), The Debt Burden and its Consequences for Monetary Policy, chapter 1, pages 3-27, Palgrave Macmillan.
    14. Abdelaziz Rouabah, 2007. "L'inflation et la rentabilité des actions : une relation énigmatique et un casse-tête pour les banques centrales," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 177(1), pages 19-34.
    15. Virginie Traclet, 2004. "Monetary and Fiscal Policies in Canada: Some Interesting Principles for EMU?," Staff Working Papers 04-28, Bank of Canada.
    16. Abdelaziz Rouabah, 2006. "L'identité de Fisher et l'interaction entre l'inflation et la rentabilité des actions: l'importance des régimes sous-jacents aux marchés boursiers," BCL working papers 18, Central Bank of Luxembourg.
    17. repec:zbw:bofrdp:2007_028 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Daly, Hounaida & Smida, Mounir, 2014. "Fiscal Theory of Price Level," MPRA Paper 60142, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    19. Wickens, Michael R. & Polito, Vito, 2008. "Optimal Monetary Policy using a VAR," CEPR Discussion Papers 6957, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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