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Corporate governance law effect in Greece

  • Themistokles Lazarides
Registered author(s):

    Purpose – Legislators legislate, but how feasible and effective the implementation and enforcement of these laws are and how congruent with the countries characteristics, is under doubt. The paper seeks to argue that the Greek law on corporate governance (CG) had no effect on the fundamental elements of the corporate environment. Design/methodology/approach – Seven hypotheses are tested using three different econometric methodologies (panel data, probit, and ordinal probit regression). Findings – The paper pinpoints the legal disarrays and their impact on the firm and argues that there is a need for a new set of principles and laws that focus on the real issues of CG rather than the size, structure and leadership of the administrating bodies or the disclosure mechanisms. Research limitations/implications – The data used have been collected from the annual reports and not from questionnaires. Furthermore, there is no methodology to integrate all seven models to a structured or nested model. Practical implications – The study provides evidence that there is a need for a different set of provisions than the ones in the Anglo-Saxon countries. Originality/value – The paper uses a variety of methodologies and tests seven hypotheses. It takes a more holistic approach.

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    Article provided by Emerald Group Publishing in its journal Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance.

    Volume (Year): 18 (2010)
    Issue (Month): 4 (November)
    Pages: 370-385

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    Handle: RePEc:eme:jfrcpp:v:18:y:2010:i:4:p:370-385
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    1. Stijn Claessens & Simeon Djankov & Joseph P. H. Fan & Larry H. P. Lang, 2002. "Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(6), pages 2741-2771, December.
    2. Agrawal, Anup & Knoeber, Charles R., 1996. "Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 31(03), pages 377-397, September.
    3. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 1999. "Corporate Ownership Around the World," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(2), pages 471-517, 04.
    4. Anup Agrawal & Charles R. Knoeber, . "Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders (Revision of 29-94)," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 8-96, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
    5. Paul Gompers & Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, 2003. "Corporate Governance And Equity Prices," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 118(1), pages 107-155, February.
    6. Himmelberg, C.P. & Hubbard, R.G. & Palia, D., 1997. "Understanding the Determinants of Mangerial Ownership and the Link Between Ownership and Performance," Papers 97-21, Columbia - Graduate School of Business.
    7. Loukas Spanos, 2005. "Corporate governance in Greece: developments and policy implications," Finance 0502017, EconWPA.
    8. Gavin J. Nicholson & Geoffrey C. Kiel, 2004. "A Framework for Diagnosing Board Effectiveness," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(4), pages 442-460, October.
    9. Klaus Gugler, 2003. "Corporate governance and investment," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 10(3), pages 261-289.
    10. Fianna Jesover & Grant Kirkpatrick, 2005. "The Revised OECD Principles of Corporate Governance and their Relevance to Non-OECD Countries," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(2), pages 127-136, 03.
    11. Capaul, Mierta & Fremond, Olivier, 2002. "The state of corporate governance - experience from country assessments," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2858, The World Bank.
    12. Pornsit Jiraporn & Kimberly C. Gleason, 2007. "Capital Structure, Shareholder Rights, And Corporate Governance," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 30(1), pages 21-33.
    13. Klaus Gugler, 1998. "Corporate Ownership Structure in Austria," Empirica, Springer, vol. 25(3), pages 285-307, January.
    14. John, Kose & Senbet, Lemma W., 1998. "Corporate governance and board effectiveness1," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 371-403, May.
    15. Maury, Benjamin & Pajuste, Anete, 2005. "Multiple large shareholders and firm value," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(7), pages 1813-1834, July.
    16. Spanos, Loukas, 2005. "Corporate governance in Greece: developments and policy implications," MPRA Paper 42901, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. Anup Agrawal & Charles R. Knoeber, . "Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders (Revision of 29-94)," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 08-96, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
    18. Demsetz, Harold & Villalonga, Belen, 2001. "Ownership structure and corporate performance," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 209-233, September.
    19. J. Kirkbride & S. Letza & X. Sun, 2005. "Corporate Governance: Towards a Theory of Regulatory Shift," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 20(1), pages 57-70, July.
    20. Alvaro Cuervo, 2002. "Corporate Governance Mechanisms: a plea for less code of good governance and more market control," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(2), pages 84-93, 04.
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