Corporate governance in Greece: developments and policy implications
This paper provides a comprehensive overview of corporate governance (CG) developments in Greece and has two objectives: to enrich the debate in this area and to contribute to the increasing literature by presenting the main aspects of the Greek CG framework; and to place the current CG developments and trends in Greece within the international debate, especially in the light of the recent debate to improve and convergence CG in the EU. First, reviews the evolution of the CG debate in Greece and its implication at the EU level. Second, provides a short view of the institutional-economic environment in Greece, as it influences corporate governance practices. Then analyzes the CG mechanisms in the light of the recent key reforms. Finally, summarizes the findings and proceeds with some critical points and recommendations. The general finding is that the development of regulatory reforms was mostly an endogenous process influenced mainly by the speculative events in the Greek capital market during 1999. The evolution of the Greek CG may have significant implication, such as that the Greek market is a newly mature euro-area market and CG is supposed to be a key factor for the competitive transformation of the capital market and the business world. In addition, the evolutionary path of CG in Greece may have significant implication for the new EU member states. The paper shows how the CG practices evolve in a small open economy influenced by speculative events and is valuable to policymakers, regulators and academics.
|Date of creation:||Jan 2005|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society 1.5(2005): pp. 15-30|
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Web page: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
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