IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/wdevel/v77y2016icp293-310.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Establishing Local Government in Fragile States: Experimental Evidence from Afghanistan

Author

Listed:
  • Jochem, Torsten
  • Murtazashvili, Ilia
  • Murtazashvili, Jennifer

Abstract

International and domestic policy makers often promote elections to establish village government in fragile states. However, two additional options are available in such countries: formalization of self-governing village councils and formalization of community development councils (CDCs). We designed a survey experiment in Afghanistan that compares the consequences of elections to establish village councils to each alternative. We find that elections, and to a lesser extent formalization of CDCs, improve support for democracy, while formalization of customary councils improves support for reconciliation with the Taliban. Moreover, the consequences of transplanting elections are contingent on social norms and institutions supportive of democracy.

Suggested Citation

  • Jochem, Torsten & Murtazashvili, Ilia & Murtazashvili, Jennifer, 2016. "Establishing Local Government in Fragile States: Experimental Evidence from Afghanistan," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 293-310.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:77:y:2016:i:c:p:293-310
    DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.08.025
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X15002065
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.08.025?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Peter J. Boettke & Christopher J. Coyne & Peter T. Leeson, 2015. "Institutional stickiness and the New Development Economics," Chapters, in: Laura E. Grube & Virgil Henry Storr (ed.), Culture and Economic Action, chapter 6, pages 123-146, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. Daron Acemoglu & Davide Cantoni & Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, 2011. "The Consequences of Radical Reform: The French Revolution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(7), pages 3286-3307, December.
    3. King, Elisabeth & Samii, Cyrus, 2014. "Fast-Track Institution Building in Conflict-Affected Countries? Insights from Recent Field Experiments," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 740-754.
    4. Berkowitz, Daniel & Pistor, Katharina & Richard, Jean-Francois, 2003. "Economic development, legality, and the transplant effect," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 165-195, February.
    5. Oliver E. Williamson, 2005. "The Economics of Governance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 1-18, May.
    6. Andrews,Matt, 2013. "The Limits of Institutional Reform in Development," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107016330, September.
    7. Myerson, Roger B., 2006. "Federalism and Incentives for Success of Democracy," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 1(1), pages 3-23, January.
    8. Bernard, Tanguy & Collion, Marie-Hélène & de Janvry, Alain & Rondot, Pierre & Sadoulet, Elisabeth, 2008. "Do Village Organizations Make a Difference in African Rural Development? A Study for Senegal and Burkina Faso," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 36(11), pages 2188-2204, November.
    9. Francis Fukuyama, 2013. "What Is Governance?," Working Papers 314, Center for Global Development.
    10. Beath, Andrew & Christia, Fotini & Enikolopov, Ruben, 2013. "Do elected councils improve governance ? experimental evidence on local institutions in Afghanistan," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6510, The World Bank.
    11. Joireman, S.F., 2008. "The Mystery of Capital Formation in Sub-Saharan Africa: Women, Property Rights and Customary Law," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 36(7), pages 1233-1246, July.
    12. Olken, Benjamin A., 2010. "Direct Democracy and Local Public Goods: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 104(2), pages 243-267, May.
    13. Platteau, Jean-Philippe & Gaspart, Frederic, 2003. "The Risk of Resource Misappropriation in Community-Driven Development," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 31(10), pages 1687-1703, October.
    14. Daron Acemoglu & Tristan Reed & James A. Robinson, 2014. "Chiefs: Economic Development and Elite Control of Civil Society in Sierra Leone," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 122(2), pages 319-368.
    15. North,Douglass C. & Wallis,John Joseph & Weingast,Barry R., 2013. "Violence and Social Orders," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107646995.
    16. Leeson, Peter T., 2007. "Better off stateless: Somalia before and after government collapse," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 689-710, December.
    17. Seidler, Valentin, 2014. "When do institutional transfers work? The relation between institutions, culture and the transplant effect: the case of Borno in north-eastern Nigeria," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 10(3), pages 371-397, September.
    18. Andrew Beath & Fotini Christia & Georgy Egorov & Ruben Enikolopov, 2014. "Electoral Rules and the Quality of Politicians: Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan," NBER Working Papers 20082, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    19. Daron Acemoglu & Matthew O. Jackson, 2015. "History, Expectations, and Leadership in the Evolution of Social Norms," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 82(2), pages 423-456.
    20. Gomes, Joseph Flavian, 2015. "The Political Economy of the Maoist Conflict in India: An Empirical Analysis," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 96-123.
    21. Heckman, James, 2013. "Sample selection bias as a specification error," Applied Econometrics, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA), vol. 31(3), pages 129-137.
    22. Peter T. Leeson, 2007. "An-arrgh-chy: The Law and Economics of Pirate Organization," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 115(6), pages 1049-1094, December.
    23. Leeson, Peter T. & Coyne, Christopher J., 2012. "Sassywood," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(4), pages 608-620.
    24. Monica Martinez-Bravo, 2014. "The Role of Local Officials in New Democracies: Evidence from Indonesia," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(4), pages 1244-1287, April.
    25. Leeson,Peter T., 2014. "Anarchy Unbound," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107629707.
    26. Dani Rodrik, 2007. "Introductiion to One Economics, Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions, and Economic Growth," Introductory Chapters, in: One Economics, Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions, and Economic Growth, Princeton University Press.
    27. Kate Baldwin, 2013. "Why Vote with the Chief? Political Connections and Public Goods Provision in Zambia," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 57(4), pages 794-809, October.
    28. Ilia Murtazashvili & Jennifer Murtazashvili, 2015. "Anarchy, self-governance, and legal titling," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 162(3), pages 287-305, March.
    29. Weingast, Barry R., 1997. "The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of the Law," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 91(2), pages 245-263, June.
    30. Peter Boettke & Christopher Coyne & Peter Leeson & Frederic Sautet, 2005. "The New Comparative Political Economy," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 18(3), pages 281-304, December.
    31. Lyall, Jason & Blair, Graeme & Imai, Kosuke, 2013. "Explaining Support for Combatants during Wartime: A Survey Experiment in Afghanistan," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 107(4), pages 679-705, November.
    32. Williamson, Oliver E, 1991. "Economic Institutions: Spontaneous and Intentional Governance," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 159-187, Special I.
    33. Avner Greif, 2006. "History Lessons: The Birth of Impersonal Exchange: The Community Responsibility System and Impartial Justice," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 20(2), pages 221-236, Spring.
    34. Coyne, Christopher J. & Boettke, Peter J., 2009. "The problem of credible commitment in reconstruction," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 5(1), pages 1-23, April.
    35. Greif, Avner, 1993. "Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: the Maghribi Traders' Coalition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(3), pages 525-548, June.
    36. Sheely, Ryan, 2015. "Mobilization, Participatory Planning Institutions, and Elite Capture: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Rural Kenya," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 251-266.
    37. Myerson, Roger, 2014. "Constitutional Structures for a Strong Democracy: Considerations on the Government of Pakistan," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 46-54.
    38. Peter Leeson, 2007. "Efficient anarchy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 130(1), pages 41-53, January.
    39. Miguel, Edward & Gugerty, Mary Kay, 2005. "Ethnic diversity, social sanctions, and public goods in Kenya," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(11-12), pages 2325-2368, December.
    40. Fritzen, Scott A., 2007. "Can the Design of Community-Driven Development Reduce the Risk of Elite Capture? Evidence from Indonesia," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 35(8), pages 1359-1375, August.
    41. Jennifer Brick Murtazashvili, 2014. "Informal Federalism: Self-Governance and Power Sharing in Afghanistan," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, CSF Associates Inc., vol. 44(2), pages 324-343.
    42. repec:bla:devpol:v:25:y:2007:i:5:p:533-574 is not listed on IDEAS
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Colin O’Reilly & Yi Zhang, 2018. "Post‐genocide justice: The Gacaca courts," Development Policy Review, Overseas Development Institute, vol. 36(5), pages 561-576, September.
    2. Lin, Wanlin & Wang, Peng & Yuan, Minjun, 2023. "Governing the knowledge commons: Hybrid relational–contractual governance in china’s mining industry," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 172(C).
    3. Ilia Murtazashvili & Jennifer Murtazashvili, 2016. "When does the emergence of a stationary bandit lead to property insecurity?," Rationality and Society, , vol. 28(3), pages 335-360, August.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ilia Murtazashvili & Jennifer Murtazashvili, 2019. "The political economy of legal titling," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 32(3), pages 251-268, September.
    2. Ilia Murtazashvili & Jennifer Murtazashvili, 2015. "Anarchy, self-governance, and legal titling," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 162(3), pages 287-305, March.
    3. Murtazashvili, Ilia & Murtazashvili, Jennifer, 2016. "The origins of private property rights: states or customary organizations?," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 12(1), pages 105-128, March.
    4. Harris,Colin & Cai,Meina & Murtazashvili,Ilia & Murtazashvili,Jennifer Brick, 2020. "The Origins and Consequences of Property Rights," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781108969055, September.
    5. Darcy W E Allen, 2020. "When Entrepreneurs Meet:The Collective Governance of New Ideas," World Scientific Books, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., number q0269, August.
    6. Baldwin, Kate & Karlan, Dean & Udry, Christopher & Appiah, Ernest, 2023. "How political insiders lose out when international aid underperforms: Evidence from a participatory development experiment in Ghana," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 169(C).
    7. Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, 2011. "Pillars of Prosperity: The Political Economics of Development Clusters," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 9624.
    8. Boettke, Peter J. & Coyne, Christopher J. & Leeson, Peter T., 2013. "Comparative historical political economy," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 9(3), pages 285-301, September.
    9. Vincent Geloso & Peter T. Leeson, 2020. "Are Anarcho-Capitalists Insane? Medieval Icelandic Conflict Institutions in Comparative Perspective," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 130(6), pages 957-974.
    10. Williamson, Claudia R., 2012. "Dignity and development," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 41(6), pages 763-771.
    11. Colin O’Reilly & Yi Zhang, 2018. "Post‐genocide justice: The Gacaca courts," Development Policy Review, Overseas Development Institute, vol. 36(5), pages 561-576, September.
    12. Skarbek, David, 2016. "Covenants without the Sword? Comparing Prison Self-Governance Globally," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 110(4), pages 845-862, November.
    13. Teppo Felin & Peter T. Leeson & Christopher J. Coyne, 2012. "Wisdom, Alterability, and Social Rules," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 33(5-6), pages 441-451, July.
    14. Lu, Jie, 2015. "Varieties of Governance in China: Migration and Institutional Change in Chinese Villages," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199378746.
    15. Ilia Murtazashvili & Ennio E. Piano, 2019. "Governance of shale gas development: Insights from the Bloomington school of institutional analysis," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 32(2), pages 159-179, June.
    16. Catalina Tejada & Eliana Ferrara & Henrik Kleven & Florian Blum & Oriana Bandiera & Michel Azulai, 2015. "State Effectiveness, Growth, and Development," Working Papers id:6668, eSocialSciences.
    17. Ilia Murtazashvili & Jennifer Murtazashvili, 2016. "When does the emergence of a stationary bandit lead to property insecurity?," Rationality and Society, , vol. 28(3), pages 335-360, August.
    18. King, Elisabeth & Samii, Cyrus, 2014. "Fast-Track Institution Building in Conflict-Affected Countries? Insights from Recent Field Experiments," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 740-754.
    19. Kapas Judit & Czegledi Pal, 2010. "Economic Freedom and Government: A Conceptual Framework," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 16(1), pages 1-26, October.
    20. Claudia R. Williamson & Carrie B. Kerekes, 2011. "Securing Private Property: Formal versus Informal Institutions," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(3), pages 537-572.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:77:y:2016:i:c:p:293-310. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/worlddev .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.