IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/transe/v136y2020ics1366554519307252.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Pricing strategies for shared parking management with double auction approach: Differential price vs. uniform price

Author

Listed:
  • Xiao, Haohan
  • Xu, Meng
  • Yang, Hai

Abstract

Focusing on the price issue in shared parking, two auction-based pricing strategies are designed in a double environment covering parking suppliers and demanders. A novel uniform price strategy (UPS) is proposed to set unique transaction prices for winning participants, it is in contrast with the differential price strategy (DPS), which sets differential transaction prices. The DPS and UPS are compared from the perspective of parking platform’s payoff and participants’ utilities theoretically and numerically. It shows that the DPS is superior to the UPS in terms of parking platform’s payoff whilst the UPS outperforms the DPS in terms of participants’ utilities.

Suggested Citation

  • Xiao, Haohan & Xu, Meng & Yang, Hai, 2020. "Pricing strategies for shared parking management with double auction approach: Differential price vs. uniform price," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 136(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:transe:v:136:y:2020:i:c:s1366554519307252
    DOI: 10.1016/j.tre.2020.101899
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1366554519307252
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Wang, Jing & Zhang, Xiaoning & Wang, Hua & Zhang, Michael, 2019. "Optimal parking supply in bi-modal transportation network considering transit scale economies," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 207-229.
    2. Anderson, Simon P. & de Palma, Andre, 2004. "The economics of pricing parking," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 1-20, January.
    3. Xu, Su Xiu & Cheng, Meng & Kong, Xiang T.R. & Yang, Hai & Huang, George Q., 2016. "Private parking slot sharing," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 93(PA), pages 596-617.
    4. Leon Yang Chu & Zuo-Jun Max Shen, 2008. "Truthful Double Auction Mechanisms," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 56(1), pages 102-120, February.
    5. Shoup, Donald C., 1997. "The High Cost of Free Parking," University of California Transportation Center, Working Papers qt25w617n7, University of California Transportation Center.
    6. Calthrop, Edward & Proost, Stef, 2006. "Regulating on-street parking," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 29-48, January.
    7. William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, March.
    8. van Ommeren, Jos & Wentink, Derk & Dekkers, Jasper, 2011. "The real price of parking policy," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 25-31, July.
    9. Shoup, Donald C., 1997. "The High Cost of Free Parking," University of California Transportation Center, Working Papers qt4vz087cc, University of California Transportation Center.
    10. Xiao, Haohan & Xu, Meng & Gao, Ziyou, 2018. "Shared parking problem: A novel truthful double auction mechanism approach," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 40-69.
    11. Leon Yang Chu & Zuo-Jun Max Shen, 2006. "Agent Competition Double-Auction Mechanism," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 52(8), pages 1215-1222, August.
    12. Edward Clarke, 1971. "Multipart pricing of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 17-33, September.
    13. Ma, Rui & Zhang, H.M., 2017. "The morning commute problem with ridesharing and dynamic parking charges," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 345-374.
    14. Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-631, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:transe:v:136:y:2020:i:c:s1366554519307252. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Haili He). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/600244/description#description .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.