Regulating on-street parking
Consider the choices available to a shopper driving to a city and trying to park downtown. One option, typical to many cities, is to follow the signposts to an off-street parking facility, which is often privately operated. Another option is to search for an on-street spot. If this proves unsuccessful, it is always possible to return to the off-street facility. We formalise such a setting and examine optimal on-street parking policy in the presence of an off-street market. Not surprisingly, the amount of socially-wasteful searching behaviour is shown to depend on the prices of both the off- and on-street market. If the off-street market is run competitively, optimal on-street policy reduces to a simple and attractive rule: set the on-street price equal to the resource cost of off-street parking supply. Other pricing rules result in either excessive searching behaviour or excessive off-street investment costs. Time restrictions - a common alternative to on-street fees - are also shown to be inefficient. In practice, however, off-street markets are unlikely to be competitive. We examine the case of a single off-street supplier playing as a Stackelberg follower to the government regulated on-street market. Based on a numerical example (calibrated to London), optimal on-street policy is shown to either involve setting a relatively high on-street price, such that the monopolist is induced to undercut and gain the entire parking demand, or setting a relatively low price, while the monopolist maximises profit on the residual demand curve. Which strategy is optimal is shown to be parameter dependent.
|Date of creation:||Feb 2002|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: +32-(0)16-32 67 25
Fax: +32-(0)16-32 67 96
Web page: http://www.econ.kuleuven.be/ew/academic/energmil
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- De Vany, Arthur S & Saving, Thomas R, 1977. "Product Quality, Uncertainty, and Regulation: The Trucking Industry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 67(4), pages 583-94, September.
- Guesnerie, Roger & Roberts, Kevin, 1984.
"Effective Policy Tools and Quantity Controls,"
Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 59-86, January.
- Edward Calthrop & Stef Proost, 2004.
"Regulating on-street parking,"
Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series
ete0410, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Energy, Transport and Environment.
- Edward Calthrop & Stef Proost, 2002. "Regulating on-street parking," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0202, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Energy, Transport and Environment.
- Glazer, Amihai & Niskanen, Esko, 1992.
"Parking fees and congestion,"
Regional Science and Urban Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 123-132, March.
- Glazer, Amihai & Niskanen, Esko, 2001. "Parking fees and congestion," University of California Transportation Center, Working Papers qt9h51t02k, University of California Transportation Center.
- Anderson, Simon P. & de Palma, Andre, 2004. "The economics of pricing parking," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 1-20, January.
- repec:cup:cbooks:9780521497190 is not listed on IDEAS
- Richard Arnott, 1990.
"A Temporal and Spatial Equilibrium Analysis of Commuter Parking,"
884, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Arnott, Richard & de Palma, Andre & Lindsey, Robin, 1991. "A temporal and spatial equilibrium analysis of commuter parking," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 301-335, August.
- Arnott, Richard & Rowse, John, 1999.
Journal of Urban Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 97-124, January.
- Carl Davidson & Raymond Deneckere, 1986. "Long-Run Competition in Capacity, Short-Run Competition in Price, and the Cournot Model," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(3), pages 404-415, Autumn.
- repec:cup:cbooks:9780521497701 is not listed on IDEAS
- Verhoef, Erik & Nijkamp, Peter & Rietveld, Piet, 1995. "The economics of regulatory parking policies: The (IM)possibilities of parking policies in traffic regulation," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 141-156, March.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ete:etewps:ete0202. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Isabelle)The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask Isabelle to update the entry or send us the correct address
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.