IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/streco/v23y2012i2p137-150.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Technology, property rights and organizational diversity in the software industry

Author

Listed:
  • Landini, Fabio

Abstract

Why do open- and closed-source productions co-exist? To address this question, the paper studies the viability of distinct systems for software development. The model shows that: (a) for low design costs of modularity, both open- and closed-source productions are viable systems; (b) closed-source production is more likely to be adopted the greater the expected rents on software; and (c) production efficiency is not a necessary condition for the stochastic stability of a system to obtain. These three results can shed light on the emergence of organizational diversity in the software industry. The paper adds to the literature in three ways: first, it considers property rights and technology as endogenous variables in the process of system design; second it argues that in producing software multiple equilibrium designs may exist; and third, it shows that, in because of high rents and low design costs of modularity, production inefficiency can be persistent.

Suggested Citation

  • Landini, Fabio, 2012. "Technology, property rights and organizational diversity in the software industry," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 137-150.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:streco:v:23:y:2012:i:2:p:137-150
    DOI: 10.1016/j.strueco.2012.01.003
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0954349X12000045
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972. "Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-795, December.
    2. Masahiko Aoki, 2013. "The Evolution of Organizational Conventions and Gains from Diversity," Chapters, in: Comparative Institutional Analysis, chapter 6, pages 59-71, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, 2005. "The Economics of Technology Sharing: Open Source and Beyond," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(2), pages 99-120, Spring.
    4. David, Paul A. & Shapiro, Joseph S., 2008. "Community-based production of open-source software: What do we know about the developers who participate?," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 364-398, December.
    5. Eric von Hippel, 2007. "Horizontal innovation networks—by and for users," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press, vol. 16(2), pages 293-315, April.
    6. den Besten, Matthijs & Dalle, Jean-Michel & Galia, Fabrice, 2008. "The allocation of collaborative efforts in open-source software," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 316-322, December.
    7. Joel West & Siobhan O'mahony, 2008. "The Role of Participation Architecture in Growing Sponsored Open Source Communities," Industry and Innovation, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(2), pages 145-168.
    8. Carliss Y. Baldwin & Kim B. Clark, 2000. "Design Rules, Volume 1: The Power of Modularity," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262024667, February.
    9. Carliss Y. Baldwin & Kim B. Clark, 2006. "The Architecture of Participation: Does Code Architecture Mitigate Free Riding in the Open Source Development Model?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 52(7), pages 1116-1127, July.
    10. Naidu, Suresh & Hwang, Sung-Ha & Bowles, Samuel, 2010. "Evolutionary bargaining with intentional idiosyncratic play," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 109(1), pages 31-33, October.
    11. Ugo Pagano, 1999. "The Origin of Organizational Species," Working Papers wp118, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
    12. Pagano, Ugo, 2011. "Interlocking complementarities and institutional change," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 7(3), pages 373-392, September.
    13. Alan MacCormack & John Rusnak & Carliss Y. Baldwin, 2006. "Exploring the Structure of Complex Software Designs: An Empirical Study of Open Source and Proprietary Code," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 52(7), pages 1015-1030, July.
    14. Masahiko Aoki, 2001. "Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262011875, February.
    15. Richard Langlois & Giampaolo Garzarelli, 2008. "Of Hackers and Hairdressers: Modularity and the Organizational Economics of Open-source Collaboration," Industry and Innovation, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(2), pages 125-143.
    16. Ugo Pagano & Maria Rossi, 2004. "Incomplete Contracts, Intellectual Property and Institutional Complementarities," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 55-76, July.
    17. Putterman, Louis, 1982. "Some behavioral perspectives on the dominance of hierarchical over democratic forms of enterprise," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(2-3), pages 139-160.
    18. Sonali K. Shah, 2006. "Motivation, Governance, and the Viability of Hybrid Forms in Open Source Software Development," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 52(7), pages 1000-1014, July.
    19. Daniel Kahneman, 2003. "Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(5), pages 1449-1475, December.
    20. Paul A. David & Francesco Rullani, 2008. "Dynamics of innovation in an “open source” collaboration environment: lurking, laboring, and launching FLOSS projects on SourceForge," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press, vol. 17(4), pages 647-710, August.
    21. Johnson, Justin P., 2006. "Collaboration, peer review and open source software," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 477-497, November.
    22. Pagano, Ugo & Rowthorn, Robert, 1994. "Ownership, technology and institutional stability," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 221-242, December.
    23. Lakhani, Karim R. & von Hippel, Eric, 2003. "How open source software works: "free" user-to-user assistance," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 32(6), pages 923-943, June.
    24. Bonaccorsi, Andrea & Rossi, Cristina, 2003. "Why Open Source software can succeed," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 32(7), pages 1243-1258, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Fabio Landini, 2012. "The Evolution of Control in the Digital Economy," Department of Economics University of Siena 655, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
    2. Landini, Fabio, 2013. "Institutional change and information production," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 9(3), pages 257-284, September.
    3. Nicita, Antonio & Pagano, Ugo, 2016. "Finance-technology complementarities: An organizational equilibria approach," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 43-51.
    4. Ugo Pagano, 2013. "Technical assets and property rights," Chapters, in: Anna Grandori (ed.), Handbook of Economic Organization, chapter 18, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    5. Erkan Gürpinar, 2013. "Organizational Forms in the Knowledge Economy: A Comparative Institutional Analysis," Department of Economics University of Siena 679, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
    6. Erkan Gurpinar, 2013. "Institutional Complementarities and Property Rights-Technology Equilibria under Knowledge Intensive Technology," Department of Economics University of Siena 673, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
    7. Fabio Landini, 2016. "The evolution of control in the digital economy," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 407-441, May.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Software production; System design; Institutional diversity; Transaction costs; Evolutionary games;

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • L17 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Open Source Products and Markets
    • O34 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:streco:v:23:y:2012:i:2:p:137-150. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/525148 .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.