The Evolution of Organizational Conventions and Gains from Diversity
This paper investigates, by using a highly abstract evolutionary game model, the mechanism of evolution of different organizational conventions, as well as roles of free trade, integration, experiments, emulation and entrepreneurial foresight for exploring gains from organizational diversity. It focuses on an aspect of organization as a voluntary association of economic agents trying to overcome the bounds of their rationality, scope of action and competence, rather than as an 'instrument' for entrepreneurial maximizing behavior, and identifies two generic forms of organization as an information system. The paper concludes by discussing the relevance of the evolutionary game model for understanding actual organizational evolutionary processes in North America and Japan. Copyright 1998 by Oxford University Press.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
|Date of creation:|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Ralph Landau Economics Building, Stanford, CA 94305-6072|
Web page: http://www-econ.stanford.edu/econ/workp/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Fudenberg, Drew & Harris, Christopher, 1992.
"Evolutionary Dynamics with Aggregate Shocks,"
IDEI Working Papers
13, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Denzau, Arthur T & North, Douglass C, 1994.
"Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions,"
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(1), pages 3-31.
- Okazaki, Tetsuji & Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara, 1997.
"Evolution of Economic Systems: The Case of Japan,"
97-F-18, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Kandori, M. & Mailath, G.J., 1991.
"Learning, Mutation, And Long Run Equilibria In Games,"
71, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - John M. Olin Program.
- Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January.
- M. Kandori & G. Mailath & R. Rob, 1999. "Learning, Mutation and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 500, David K. Levine.
- Aoki, Masahiko, 1986.
"Horizontal vs. Vertical Information Structure of the Firm,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 76(5), pages 971-83, December.
- Masahiko Aoki, 2013. "Horizontal vs. Vertical Information Structure of the Firm," Chapters, in: Comparative Institutional Analysis, chapter 5, pages 57-58 Edward Elgar.
- Paul Krugman, 1991. "History versus Expectations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 106(2), pages 651-667.
- Eric Maskin & Yingyi Quan & Chenggang Xu, 1997.
"Incentives, Scale Economies, and Organizational Form,"
William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series
51, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
- Eric Maskin & Yingyi Qian & Chengagn Xu, 1997. "Incentives, Scale Economies and Organizational Form," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1801, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Aoki Masahiko, 1995. "An Evolving Diversity of Organizational Mode and Its Implications for Transitional Economies," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 330-353, December.
- Itoh, Hideshi, 1987. "Information processing capacities of the firm," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 1(3), pages 299-326, September.
- Kiminori Matsuyama, 1991. "Increasing Returns, Industrialization, and Indeterminacy of Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 106(2), pages 617-650.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wop:stanec:97032. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.