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Term limits and the tobacco industry

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  • Apollonio, Dorie E.
  • Glantz, Stanton A.
  • Bero, Lisa A.

Abstract

In the 1990s several American states passed term limits on legislators with the stated intention of reducing the influence of wealthy industries on career legislators. Although term limits in the United States do not have a direct relationship to public health, the tobacco industry anticipated that term limits could have indirect effects by either limiting or expanding industry influence. We detail the strategy of the tobacco industry in the wake of term limits using internal tobacco company documents and a database of campaign contributions made to legislators in term limited states between 1988 and 2002. Despite some expectations that term limits would limit tobacco industry access to state legislators, term limits appear to have had the opposite effect.

Suggested Citation

  • Apollonio, Dorie E. & Glantz, Stanton A. & Bero, Lisa A., 2014. "Term limits and the tobacco industry," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 1-5.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:socmed:v:104:y:2014:i:c:p:1-5
    DOI: 10.1016/j.socscimed.2013.11.005
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    References listed on IDEAS

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