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Solving procurement problems in public transport: Examining multi-principal roles in relation to effective control mechanisms

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  • Hansson, Lisa

Abstract

Despite the EU's increasing role in regulating public transport procurement, few studies have considered this aspect when analysing procurement problems of public transport. This paper examines how the institutional relationships between different actors, including international governmental bodies, in public transport effects the possibility of exerting control over a county public transport authority (PTA) in a multi-principal setting. The analysis is carried out using empirical material from an infringement process including a Swedish PTA and the EU. The conclusions have clear policy implications for the procedural order when exerting control over the PTA in cases of procurement problems. It is for example shown, that the implementation process would be much more efficient if the regulations allowed the EU to impose sanctions directly towards the local authorities without having to involve the national government when the procurement laws are violated.

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  • Hansson, Lisa, 2010. "Solving procurement problems in public transport: Examining multi-principal roles in relation to effective control mechanisms," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 124-132.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:retrec:v:29:y:2010:i:1:p:124-132
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    Cited by:

    1. Paulsson, Alexander & Isaksson, Karolina & Sørensen, Claus Hedegaard & Hrelja, Robert & Rye, Tom & Scholten, Christina, 2018. "Collaboration in public transport planning – Why, how and what?," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 377-385.
    2. Hansson, Lisa, 2013. "Hybrid steering cultures in the governance of public transport: A successful way to meet demands?," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 175-184.
    3. Thao, Vu Thi & Wegelin, Philipp & von Arx, Widar, 2017. "Are statutory passenger watchdogs effective in representing passenger interests in public transport?," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 1-9.
    4. Andrea Lodi & Enrico Malaguti & Nicolás E. Stier-Moses & Tommaso Bonino, 2016. "Design and Control of Public-Service Contracts and an Application to Public Transportation Systems," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(4), pages 1165-1187, April.
    5. Holmgren, Johan, 2013. "The efficiency of public transport operations – An evaluation using stochastic frontier analysis," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 50-57.
    6. McTigue, Clare & Monios, Jason & Rye, Tom, 2020. "The principal-agent problem in contracting public transport provision to private operators: A case study of the UK Quality Contract Scheme," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    7. Hansson, Lisa, 2020. "Public administrators’ roles in the policy adaptation of transport directives: How knowledge is created and reproduced," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 208-216.

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