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The Private Whistleblower: Defining a New Role in the Public Procurement System

Listed author(s):
  • Hansson Lisa

    (Swedish National Road and Transport Research Institute)

Registered author(s):

    Due to EU legislation, public procurement through competitive tendering has been applied in most European countries. One purpose of such procurement is to lower the costs of the procured service and another is for the political level to gain better control over what it is purchasing. However, monitoring problems exist when conducting public procurements; recent studies indicate that actions related to public servant corruption are most common in public procurement processes. Citing cases from Sweden, this article argue that, in the case of public procurement, private firms have assumed a monitoring role towards the public sector similar to that of whistleblowers, and that the public system in fact depends on private firms to detect procurement bypasses committed by civil servants. This article provides an understanding of this monitoring role and discusses its theoretical and practical implications for the public system. I conclude that upholding the public system is not the primary objective of the private whistleblower but a positive side effect. The monitoring role is analyzed in the framework of principal–agent theory and should be seen as complementary to the existing monitoring functions available to public principals.

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    File URL: https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bap.2012.14.issue-2/1469-3569.1406/1469-3569.1406.xml?format=INT
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    Article provided by De Gruyter in its journal Business and Politics.

    Volume (Year): 14 (2012)
    Issue (Month): 2 (August)
    Pages: 1-28

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    Handle: RePEc:bpj:buspol:v:14:y:2012:i:2:n:2
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    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

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    1. Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 181-214, Fall.
    2. Evenett, Simon J. & Hoekman, Bernard M., 2005. "Government procurement: market access, transparency, and multilateral trade rules," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 163-183, March.
    3. David E. M. Sappington, 1991. "Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(2), pages 45-66, Spring.
    4. Dimitri Mardas & Dimitri Triantafyllou, 1997. "Selection criteria and the award procedure in public procurement," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 3(1), pages 91-112, February.
    5. repec:kap:iaecre:v:3:y:1997:i:1:p:91-112 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Hopenhayn, Hugo & Lohmann, Susanne, 1996. "Fire-Alarm Signals and the Political Oversight of Regulatory Agencies," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 12(1), pages 196-213, April.
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