Fire-Alarm Signals and the Political Oversight of Regulatory Agencies
In political settings, delegation is often motivated by differences in expertise of costs of information gathering. Even if a political principal is less well informed than a regulatory agency, she can monitor whether the agency is acting in her best interests by taking informational cues from the media, interest groups, and constituents. In response to such "fire-alarm" signals, the principal may engage in political oversight activities. This article examines how asymmetric external information flows give rise to asymmetric political control rules that introduce bias and inconsistency into regulatory outcomes. Copyright 1996 by Oxford University Press.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Volume (Year): 12 (1996)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK|
Fax: 01865 267 985
Web page: https://academic.oup.com/jleo
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.oup.co.uk/journals|