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College sports governance: “Amateurism” enforcement in big time college sports

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  • Rodney Fort

    (University of Michigan)

Abstract

A major element of college sports governance is the enforcement of “amateurism”, that is, no pay beyond the grant-in-aid. Enforcement is a joint venture by university administrators through their National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) that preserves this interesting definition of amateurism and the wealth transfer it creates from athletes to those same administrators. Enforcement criticism abounds, aimed at the NCAA without any model of that process or incorporation of the motivations for enforcement. Three criticisms amenable to economic analysis are evaluated, that the level of enforcement is too low, is passive rather than active, and biased against lower-revenue programs. Basic economic modeling provides testable implications regarding these criticisms, rather than finger-pointing at the NCAA, hopefully adding to meaningful reform efforts.

Suggested Citation

  • Rodney Fort, 2022. "College sports governance: “Amateurism” enforcement in big time college sports," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 23(3), pages 303-322, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:23:y:2022:i:3:d:10.1007_s10101-022-00279-w
    DOI: 10.1007/s10101-022-00279-w
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    References listed on IDEAS

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