Design and Control of Public-Service Contracts and an Application to Public Transportation Systems
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DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2015.2174
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Cited by:
- Algaba, Encarnación & Fragnelli, Vito & Llorca, Natividad & Sánchez-Soriano, Joaquin, 2019. "Horizontal cooperation in a multimodal public transport system: The profit allocation problem," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 275(2), pages 659-665.
- Sheng, Dian & Meng, Qiang, 2020. "Public bus service contracting: A critical review and future research opportunities," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
- Luo, Qingyu & Bing, Xue & Jia, Hongfei & Song, Jinge, 2022. "An incentive subsidy mechanism for bus lines based on service level," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 1-13.
- Eduard Calvo & Ruomeng Cui & Juan Camilo Serpa, 2019. "Oversight and Efficiency in Public Projects: A Regression Discontinuity Analysis," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(12), pages 5651-5675, December.
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Keywords
integer programming application; public transportation; transit systems; vehicle routing; economics; game theory and bargaining theory;All these keywords.
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