Welfare properties of spatial competition with location-dependent costs
We analyze a two-firm spatial competition model in which firms must transport raw materials from a raw material site to their locations in order to produce. The model has two equilibrium configurations: (i) a symmetric one in which firms locates equidistantly from the raw material site, and (ii) an asymmetric one in which one firm locates at the raw material site and the other locates distantly from it. We show that these two configurations are possible as multiple equilibria, that the asymmetric equilibrium is more efficient than the symmetric one, and that the social welfare first falls then rises as transport costs decline.
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