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When to Initiate an International Vertical Merger? The Impact of Negative Demand Shock

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  • Jie Li
  • Xianhai Huang

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  • Jie Li & Xianhai Huang, 2013. "When to Initiate an International Vertical Merger? The Impact of Negative Demand Shock," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(7), pages 843-860, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:worlde:v:36:y:2013:i:7:p:843-860
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ziss, Steffen, 1993. "Entry deterrence, cost advantage and horizontal product differentiation," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 523-543, September.
    2. Volker Nocke & Lucy White, 2007. "Do Vertical Mergers Facilitate Upstream Collusion?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(4), pages 1321-1339, September.
    3. Eaton, B Curtis & Schmitt, Nicolas, 1994. "Flexible Manufacturing and Market Structure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 875-888, September.
    4. Giovanni Maggi & Andres Rodriguez-Clare, 1998. "The Value of Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(3), pages 574-601, June.
    5. Julie Hunsaker, 1999. "The role of debt and bankruptcy statutes in facilitating tacit collusion," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 20(1), pages 9-24.
    6. Matsushima, Noriaki, 2004. "Technology of upstream firms and equilibrium product differentiation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(8-9), pages 1091-1114, November.
    7. Brander, James A. & Lewis, Tracy R., 1986. "Oligopoly and Financial Structure: The Limited Liability Effect," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(5), pages 956-970, December.
    8. Zhihao Yu, 2000. "A model of substitution of non‐tariff barriers for tariffs," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 33(4), pages 1069-1090, November.
    9. Chen, Yongmin, 2001. "On Vertical Mergers and Their Competitive Effects," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(4), pages 667-685, Winter.
    10. Qiu, Larry D. & Zhou, Wen, 2006. "International mergers: Incentives and welfare," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 38-58, January.
    11. Ordover, Janusz A & Saloner, Garth & Salop, Steven C, 1990. "Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 127-142, March.
    12. Norman, George & Thisse, Jacques-Francois, 1999. "Technology Choice and Market Structure: Strategic Aspects of Flexible Manufacturing," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(3), pages 345-372, September.
    13. James A. Brander & Tracy R. Lewis, 1988. "Bankruptcy Costs and the Theory of Oligopoly," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 21(2), pages 221-243, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hana BOR & Avraham KETKO, 2019. "A University Reinvents Itself: A Case Study For Understanding Strategic Mergers And Integration Between Academic Institutions," REVISTA DE MANAGEMENT COMPARAT INTERNATIONAL/REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE MANAGEMENT, Faculty of Management, Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest, Romania, vol. 20(3), pages 241-258, July.

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