IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/glofin/v67y2025ics1044028325000821.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Impact of vertical mergers on rivals' cost of debt

Author

Listed:
  • Fallah, Mohammadali
  • Kadapakkam, Palani-Rajan
  • Oliveira, Mauro

Abstract

We investigate the impact of vertical mergers on bank loans of acquirers' and targets' rivals. Following a vertical merger, these rivals experience higher interest rate spreads on bank loans, shorter loan maturities, and more stringent contract covenants. We observe the increase in the cost of debt whether or not the merger is part of an industry merger wave, mitigating concerns that unobserved industry factors drive our findings. While vertical mergers can foreclose markets for rivals, they can also create efficiencies for the merging firms by reducing the holdup problem in relationship-specific investments. Utilizing asset specificity measures to assess the severity of the holdup problem, we find that rivals' cost of debt increases when vertical mergers are more likely motivated by foreclosure rather than efficiency motives.

Suggested Citation

  • Fallah, Mohammadali & Kadapakkam, Palani-Rajan & Oliveira, Mauro, 2025. "Impact of vertical mergers on rivals' cost of debt," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:glofin:v:67:y:2025:i:c:s1044028325000821
    DOI: 10.1016/j.gfj.2025.101155
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1044028325000821
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.gfj.2025.101155?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:glofin:v:67:y:2025:i:c:s1044028325000821. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/620162 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.