Socially optimal procurement with tight budgets and rationing
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Antle, Rick & Bogetoft, Peter & Stark, Andrew W., 2001.
"Information systems, incentives and the timing of investments,"
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy,
Elsevier, vol. 20(4-5), pages 267-294.
- Antle, Rick & Bogetoft, Peter & Stark, Andrew W., 2000. "Information Systems, Incentives and the Timing of Investment," Unit of Economics Working papers 24201, Royal Veterinary and Agricultural University, Food and Resource Economic Institute.
- Thomas, Lionel, 2002. "Non-linear pricing with budget constraint," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 257-263, April.
- Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1982.
"Utilitarianism and horizontal equity : The case for random taxation,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 1-33, June.
- Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1981. "Utilitarianism and Horizontal Equity: The Case for Random Taxation," NBER Working Papers 0694, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Demski, Joel S. & Sappington, David, 1984. "Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 152-171, June.
- Axel Gautier & Manipushpak Mitra, 2006. "Regulating a monopolist with limited funds," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 27(3), pages 705-718, April.
- Wijkander, Hans, 1988. "Equity and Efficiency in Public Sector Pricing: A Case for Stochastic Rationing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(6), pages 1455-1465, November.
- Myerson, Roger B, 1979.
"Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem,"
Econometric Society, vol. 47(1), pages 61-73, January.
- Roger B. Myerson, 1977. "Incentive Compatability and the Bargaining Problem," Discussion Papers 284, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Axel Gautier, 2004. "Regulation under Financial Constraints," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 75(4), pages 645-656, December.
- Levaggi, Rosella, 1999. "Optimal Procurement Contracts under a Binding Budget Constraint," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 101(1-2), pages 23-37, October.
- Wilson, Robert B, 1989. "Efficient and Competitive Rationing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(1), pages 1-40, January.
- Crocker, Keith J & Masten, Scott E, 1996. "Regulation and Administered Contracts Revisited: Lessons from Transaction-Cost Economics for Public Utility Regulation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 5-39, January.
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Robert, Jacques, 1996. "Optimal auction with financially constrained buyers," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 181-186, August.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Vedel, Suzanne Elizabeth & Jacobsen, Jette Bredahl & Thorsen, Bo Jellesmark, 2015. "Contracts for afforestation and the role of monitoring for landowners’ willingness to accept," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 29-37.
- Tigran Melkonyan & Michael H. Taylor, 2013.
"Regulatory Policy Design for Agroecosystem Management on Public Rangelands,"
American Journal of Agricultural Economics,
Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 95(3), pages 606-627.
- Tigran Melkonyan & Michael Taylor, 2010. "Regulatory Policy Design for Agroecosystem Management on Public Rangelands," Working Papers 10-007, University of Nevada, Reno, Department of Economics;University of Nevada, Reno , Department of Resource Economics.
- Delacote, Philippe & Palmer, Charles & Bakkegaard, Riyong Kim & Thorsen, Bo Jellesmark, 2014.
"Unveiling information on opportunity costs in REDD: Who obtains the surplus when policy objectives differ?,"
Resource and Energy Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 508-527.
- Philippe Delacote & Charles Palmer & Ryiong Kim Bakkegaard & Bo Jellesmark Thorsen, 2014. "Unveiling information on opportunity costs in REDD: Who obtains the surplus when policy objectives differ?," Post-Print hal-01024447, HAL.
- Vedel, Suzanne Elizabeth & Thorsen, Bo Jellesmark & Jacobsen, Jette Bredahl, 2009. "First-movers, non-movers, and social gains from subsidising entry in markets for nature-based recreational goods," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(8-9), pages 2363-2371, June.
More about this item
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:91:y:2007:i:7-8:p:1625-1642. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578 .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.