IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cor/louvrp/1843.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Regulating a monopolist with limited funds

Author

Listed:
  • GAUTIER, Axel
  • MITRA, Munipushpak

Abstract

We consider the problem of regulating a monopolist with unknown costs when the regulator has limited funds. The optimal regulatory mechanism satisfies four properties. The first property is bunching at the top, that is the more efficient types produce the same quantity irrespective of their costs. The second property is separability of less efficient types. The third property is full bunching of types when the available fund is small enough. The fourth property of the mechanism is that it is a third best one, that is, the output under this regulatory mechanism is strictly lower than the second best output for any given type. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2006
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • GAUTIER, Axel & MITRA, Munipushpak, 2006. "Regulating a monopolist with limited funds," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1843, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:1843
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-004-0555-8
    Note: In : Economic Theory, 27, 705-718, 2006
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-004-0555-8
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s00199-004-0555-8?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Willems, Bert & Zwart, Gijsbert, 2016. "Regulatory Holidays and Optimal Network Expansion," Discussion Paper 2016-015, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    2. Anthon, Signe & Bogetoft, Peter & Thorsen, Bo Jellesmark, 2007. "Socially optimal procurement with tight budgets and rationing," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(7-8), pages 1625-1642, August.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:1843. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Alain GILLIS (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/coreebe.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.