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Selecting health care providers: "Any willing provider" vs. negotiation

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  • Barros, Pedro Pita
  • Martinez-Giralt, Xavier

Abstract

We study how a third-party payer decides what providers to contract with. Two mechanisms are studied and their properties compared. A first mechanism consists of the so-called "any willing provider" where the third-party payer announces a contract and every provider freely decides to sign it or not. The second mechanism is a bargaining procedure with the providers set up by the third-party payer. The main finding is that the decision of the third-party payer depends on the surplus to be shared. When it is relatively high (low) the third-party payer prefers the any willing provider system (negotiated solution).

Suggested Citation

  • Barros, Pedro Pita & Martinez-Giralt, Xavier, 2008. "Selecting health care providers: "Any willing provider" vs. negotiation," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 402-414, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:24:y:2008:i:2:p:402-414
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    Cited by:

    1. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2018. "Medical service provider networks," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(8), pages 1201-1217, August.
    2. Boone, Jan, 2019. "Health provider networks with private contracts: Is there under-treatment in narrow networks?," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    3. Eleonora Fichera & Hugh Gravelle & Mario Pezzino & Matt Sutton, 2013. "Choice of contracts for quality in health care: Evidence from the British NHS," Working Papers 085cherp, Centre for Health Economics, University of York.
    4. Kuhn, Michael & Siciliani, Luigi, 2013. "Manipulation and auditing of public sector contracts," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 251-267.
    5. Eleonora Fichera & Hugh Gravelle & Mario Pezzino & Matt Sutton, 2012. "Specification of financial incentives for quality in health care contracts," Economics Discussion Paper Series 1218, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    6. ., 2012. "Models of Negotiation and Bargaining in Health Care," Chapters, in: Andrew M. Jones (ed.), The Elgar Companion to Health Economics, Second Edition, chapter 21, Edward Elgar Publishing.

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