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Interbank market, stock market, and bank performance in East Asia

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  • Inoguchi, Masahiro

Abstract

This paper investigates the role of stock and interbank markets in measuring bank performance in Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand. Research on whether financial markets served in terms of assessment and discipline of banks has been done in advanced countries; however, there has been limited research on this question as it applies to banks in East Asian countries. The stock price of individual banks can reflect a bank's risk profile, interbank loans to domestic banks with higher risk and bad performance may decline, and interbank borrowing rates charged to banks can respond to bank performance. This functioning of the stock and interbank markets is particularly important from the view of maintaining and strengthening the domestic banking sectors and the financial system in East Asia. This paper employs panel regression techniques and examines whether interbank transactions and stock prices of domestic commercial banks responded to bank risk and performance in those Asian countries. The regression results suggest that interbank borrowing, the borrowing rate, and foreign currency borrowing were affected by bank risk variables subsequent to the 1997 crisis in Thailand. In Korea, foreign currency borrowing of domestic banks may respond to bank risk after the crisis. In the case of stock markets, the regression shows that bank risk influenced each bank's stock price in Korea and Malaysia. The results for Thailand suggest that bank risk and cost affected bank stock prices after the crisis. These findings imply that improving both the interbank market and the stock market may play a role in establishing a sound banking system through market discipline effects.

Suggested Citation

  • Inoguchi, Masahiro, 2013. "Interbank market, stock market, and bank performance in East Asia," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 136-156.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:pacfin:v:25:y:2013:i:c:p:136-156
    DOI: 10.1016/j.pacfin.2013.08.006
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    Cited by:

    1. Shailesh Rastogi & Rajani Gupte & R. Meenakshi, 2021. "A Holistic Perspective on Bank Performance Using Regulation, Profitability, and Risk-Taking with a View on Ownership Concentration," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 14(3), pages 1-22, March.
    2. Matteo Smerlak & Brady Stoll & Agam Gupta & James S Magdanz, 2015. "Mapping Systemic Risk: Critical Degree and Failures Distribution in Financial Networks," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 10(7), pages 1-15, July.
    3. Mamiza Haq & Necmi K. Avkiran & Amine Tarazi, 2019. "Does market discipline impact bank charter value? The case for Australia and Canada," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 59(1), pages 253-276, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Interbank borrowing; Stock prices; Foreign borrowing; Bank characteristic; Asia;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
    • O16 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance

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